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Reclaiming the Constitutional Text from 
Originalism: The Case of Executive 
Power 
Victoria Nourse* 
There are consequences to theories in a world questioning the 
power of the President. For decades, some originalists, including 
Justice Scalia, maintained that the President enjoys “all” executive 
power. Of course, this is not the Constitution’s actual text (which 
refers to “the” executive power, not “all” executive power)—but a 
highly contestable, and potentially dangerous, addition of meaning to 
the text. As I demonstrate in this Article, adding to the actual text of 
the Constitution is common in the originalist literature on executive 
power, whether the precise question is the President’s removal power, 
the President’s power to refuse to enforce the law, or the President’s 
obligations under the Emoluments Clause. Using elementary 
principles from the philosophy of language—principles that apply to 
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all communication—I explain how originalist interpreters in this area 
“pragmatically enrich” the text, without articulating or justifying 
those additions and without seeking to test those meanings against the 
full text of the Constitution. Before one gets to history, the originalist 
has assumed a unit of textual analysis—a word, a clause, a 
paragraph—that may effectively enrich the meaning to reflect the 
interpreter’s preferred policy position. If this is correct, originalists 
must theorize the “interpretation zone,” a putatively neutral place 
from which historical inquiries are launched, and explain why 
interpreters may add meaning by pragmatic enrichment in this zone—
particularly if those meanings are falsified by the rest of the 
Constitution. Perhaps more importantly, originalism’s opponents need 
to start talking about how to reclaim the actual text of the Constitution. 
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With the death of Justice Antonin Scalia, and Justice Neil Gorsuch 
confirmed, one very basic question remains as to whether the Supreme Court 
will now cleave more closely to Justice Scalia’s theory of constitutional 
interpretation—originalism.1 Even more important, given the current presidency, 
is the question whether the Court will accept Justice Scalia’s textualist view of 
“executive power” as including “all” executive power. These issues of 
contemporary concern raise deeper theoretical questions about the relationship 
of originalism to textualism, including originalists’ methodological 
commitments to an analysis that depends upon, but does not acknowledge, a kind 
of textual slicing and dicing that should be subject to greater scrutiny. Before one 
gets to history in originalist analysis, one starts with text and sometimes, as in 
“all” executive power, the purported text is not, in fact, the actual text of the 
Constitution.2 
As Justice Elena Kagan has noted, we are all constitutional textualists and 
originalists now;3 well not all,4 but textualism has become an extremely 
 
 1. As Randy Barnett has written, Justice Scalia was in fact a “faint-hearted” originalist, 
unwilling in many cases to overrule lengthy lines of precedent. Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A 
Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7 (2006); see, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 
U.S. 1 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 2. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 705 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“To repeat, 
Article II, § 1, cl. 1, of the Constitution provides: ‘The executive Power shall be vested in a President of 
the United States.’ As I described at the outset of this opinion, this does not mean some of the executive 
power, but all of the executive power.”); see also id. at 726 (“Humphrey’s Executor at least had the 
decency formally to observe the constitutional principle that the President had to be the repository of all 
executive power . . . .”). Justice Scalia is not the only one who has urged that the President’s powers are 
broad and plenary. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein et al., Federalism: Executive Power in Wartime, 5 GEO. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 309, 333 (2007) (quoting John Yoo as stating: “And then the Framers vested the 
executive power, all executive power, in the President, in contrast to Article I, which says the legislative 
Powers herein enumerated are vested in the Congress . . . .”); Saikrishna Prakash, Regulating 
Presidential Powers, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 215, 217 (2005) (concluding that Congress “cannot regulate 
the President’s constitutional powers”); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 
63 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1038 (2011) (stating that the President has “all” executive power). Note that 
originalists differ on whether the President can act contra legem, which is to say, contrary to law. See 
Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE 
L.J. 541, 565 (1994) (noting claims of unenumerated, inherent presidential power to act contra legem 
and discussing the skepticism that greets such claims). At least one originalist takes the position that the 
term “executive power” is vague. See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional 
Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 470 (2013). 
 3. Justice Elena Kagan, The Scalia Lecture: A Dialogue with Justice Kagan on the Reading of 
Statutes, at 8:29, HARV. L. TODAY (Nov. 17, 2015), http://today.law.harvard.edu/in-scalia-lecture-
kagan-discusses-statutory-interpretation [https://perma.cc/D682-ZKZL]; Confirmation Hearing on the 
Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 62 (2010) (testimony of Elena Kagan). 
 4. Recently, Judge Posner has declared himself against textualism. See Eric J. Segall, The 
Constitution Means What the Supreme Court Says It Means, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 176, 176 (2016). 
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important conventional methodological position that deserves greater scrutiny.5 
In cases of first impression, constitutional text has been seen as important since 
the Founding.6 On the other hand, the rather terse text of the Constitution cannot 
possibly account for constitutional doctrine’s enormous reach. The vast, vast 
bulk of constitutional law—layers of scrutiny, expectations of privacy, undue 
burden tests—has little grounding in constitutional text. In our present world, 
textual originalism and common law constitutionalism exist simultaneously. 
I leave to others exogenous normative critiques of originalism,7 given its 
many, many meanings, some of them overtly politicized and others not.8 History 
will play little role in this Article because I mean to question the interpretive step 
that occurs before one consults ancient dictionaries—the step that occurs in 
selecting and interpreting a constitutional text. I look seriously at the 
undertheorized textualist assumptions of “original public meaning”9 focusing on 
originalist writing on executive power. I will argue that originalist 
interpretations in this area do not, in fact, depend upon the literal text but what 
linguistic philosophers call “pragmatic-enrichment”—a basic feature of 
linguistic communication—which adds meaning to the text. In these cases, it is 
not the text that decides but the interpretive meanings added by interpreters 
before they have had recourse to history. Just as Karl Llewellyn blasted canons 
 
 5. See, e.g., ROBERT W. BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINALISM: 
A DEBATE 16 (2011) (“A good interpretation aims at the fixed, original, linguistic meaning of the 
text.”). 
 6. See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407–08, 411–16 (1819) (considering the 
absence of “bank” or “incorporation” in the Constitution and interpreting the “necessary and proper” 
clause). I understand that the textual arguments in this case were embedded in a much richer context. 
See Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 749–58 (1999) (discussing various 
constitutional arguments employed in McCulloch, particularly intratextualism). Saying “text is 
important” is not to deny that other forms of argument were common and present in this case and others. 
In my view, the true “originalist” method was derived from Blackstone’s theory of statutory 
interpretation and is pluralistic. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
59–62 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1979) (1765–1769) (discussing the various steps of statutory interpretation 
and how to resolve statutory ambiguity, including references to “subject matter” and “reason” of the 
statute). 
 7. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Foreword: Does the Constitution Mean What It Says?, 129 
HARV. L. REV. 1 (2015). David Strauss, among others, has argued that to accept originalism one would 
have to accept all sorts of unacceptable normative propositions. Originalist scholars have provided 
powerful rejoinders. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 
81 VA. L. REV. 947, 950–54 (1995) (arguing that an originalist interpretation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment would not permit school segregation). My critique is not about the normative consequences 
of particular decisions but undertheorized interpretive methodology and therefore should be of interest 
to originalists and non-originalists. 
 8. For a useful taxonomy of the varieties of originalism, including the term’s “thick” ability to 
combine both ideological and descriptive concepts, see Lawrence Solum, The Constraint Principle: 
Original Meaning and Constitutional Practice 6–9, 15–18 (Mar. 24, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2940215 [https://perma.cc/XZ5A-8V7H]. 
 9. Original public meaning is described as “conventional semantic meaning” and is 
distinguished from original expected application meaning. BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 5, at 11–16 
(arguing that original public meaning is an argument about “the way that language works,” not an 
argument about normative ends). 
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from the inside, arguing that there is a counter-canon for every canon,10 this 
Article argues, from what appears to be “inside” the interpretation zone, that 
originalists and non-originalists must have a much more precise, and theorized, 
approach toward the constitutional text.11 In the cases that follow, the hard edges 
of constraint are too often edges added by interpreters. 
Originalists complain that scholars refuse to be “bound by the actual words 
of the Constitution because those words are obstacles to noble objectives.”12 If 
this is true, it is time for those who have resisted textualism to embrace what I 
call “analytic textualism.” I accept the notion that text, where clear, governs. 
Text can operate as the conscience13 of a court whose own precedents have 
strayed far and wide. I also recognize that originalists differ in their theoretical 
approach and their view of executive power.14 On the other hand, a good deal of 
originalist analysis of executive power lacks a consistent theory of the unit of 
textual analysis or awareness that originalist interpretations can, in fact, add 
meaning to the text of the Constitution, before resorting to historical materials. 
If I am correct about the choice and enrichment of text in this area, both 
textualists and originalists must consider whether this “added meaning” 
phenomenon is generalizable to other areas of constitutional law15 and whether 
 
 10. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons 
About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950). 
 11. Lawrence Solum has done the most to theorize textual analysis in originalist theory, and my 
approach here would not exist but for his attention to textual detail and philosophical nuance. Indeed, 
Solum was the first to identify pragmatic enrichment and presupposition in textual analysis of the 
Constitution. See Solum, supra note 2, at 465 n.47. 
 12. RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF 
LIBERTY 2 (Princeton Univ. Press rev. ed. 2014) (2004). 
 13. As Thomas Jefferson asserted, “written constitutions may be violated in moments of passion 
or delusion, yet they furnish a text to which those who are watchful may again rally [and] recall the 
people . . . .” Eric R. Nitz, Note, Comparing Apples to Apples: A Federalism-Based Theory for the Use 
of Founding-Era State Constitutions to Interpret the Constitution, 100 GEO. L.J. 295, 297 (2011) 
(quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Doctor Joseph Priestley (June 19, 1802), in 8 THE WRITINGS 
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 158, 159–60 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1897)). To accept this is not to concede 
the point that text always constrains; this is a claim that text can reflect an experience of life that, as a 
normative (as opposed to a linguistic) matter, deserves recognition. For example, a redemptive 
originalism would urge judges to reconsider why they have read the privileges and immunities clause 
out of the Constitution. 
 14. Libertarian originalists have every reason to reject broad executive power. Larry Solum has 
written that the term “executive power” is vague. Solum, supra note 2, at 470. This is contrary to the 
claims of Calabresi and Prakash, Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 2, at 557, and Calabresi and Rhodes, 
Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural 
Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1153 (1992); see also STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, 
THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH (2008) (examining 
presidential power under each presidential administration from George Washington through George W. 
Bush and arguing that all advanced the unitary executive theory); Gary Lawson & Christopher D. 
Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 IOWA L. REV. 1267 (1996) (affirming 
the interpretation of the Vesting Clauses as a grant of power). 
 15. There are reasons to think that it is. See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. 
Ct. 2566, 2573, 2586–87 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion) (writing that the Affordable Care Act 
violated the Commerce Clause, reading that clause as covering only “existing” commerce); Marbury v. 
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it is consistent with originalism’s basic commitments to the text. Perhaps more 
importantly, this Article should be a provocation for those who disagree with 
originalism: the non-textualist and non-originalist cannot simply ignore text; 
they must learn to work out, and resist, textual claims that are not in fact found 
in the Constitution. 
The roadmap: In Part I, I consider the state of originalism and its 
presumptions about text and history, arguing that, in the case of executive power, 
originalists have relied upon text as much as history. In Part II, I argue that 
originalists theorize an “interpretation zone” in which meaning is non-normative 
and self-evident but that this makes two crucial contestable assumptions. These 
are: (1) the originalist has chosen the proper and only relevant text and has not 
added to the text by pragmatic inference; and (2) the text chosen—one or two 
words in some cases—amounts to the proper unit of textual analysis. Using two 
basic principles from the philosophy of language—pragmatic inference and 
cancellation—this Part amplifies this methodological critique. In Part III, the 
concepts developed in Part II are applied to famous cases about executive power 
from Steel Seizure to Morrison v. Olson.16 I argue that liberal and conservative 
judges are not, in fact, relying upon the text but adding to the text on executive 
power and that the whole text can falsify their inferred additions. In Part IV, I 
apply this critique to originalist arguments on topics of current importance 
relating to the President’s powers, including the Emoluments Clause, the 
removal question, and the President’s non-enforcement power. I demonstrate 
contestable textual enrichment in each area. Finally, in Part V, I consider 
objections to this claim, distinguish it from other theories on constitutional text 
(such as intratexualism and holism), and defend pluralism as a restraint on false 
textual meanings. 
I. 
ORIGINALISM’S TEXTUAL METHODOLOGY 
Theories of originalism abound. So do critiques. Once upon a time, 
theorists argued about whether one should care about the Founders’ original 
expectations; now they search for “original public meanings.”17 In the 1990s, 
originalism’s critics seemed satisfied to say that history was vague, and the 
 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173–75 (1803) (reading Article III original jurisdiction as exclusive); 
see also Victoria Nourse, Picking and Choosing Text, 70 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (applying 
this analysis to a variety of statutory cases). 
 16. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Morrison v. Olson, 487 
U.S. 654 (1988). 
 17. BARNETT, supra note 12, at 95; Lawrence B. Solum, What Is Originalism? The Evolution 
of Contemporary Originalist Theory, in THE CHALLENGE OF ORIGINALISM: THEORIES OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12, 22–23 (Grant Huscroft & Bradley W. Miller eds., 2011). 
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Founders themselves were faint-hearted originalists.18 By the end of the decade, 
many thought originalism dead.19 Meanwhile, in real life, originalism has grown 
stronger. It has grown stronger on the Supreme Court, where it has had notable 
victories.20 As Justice Kagan has said, we are all originalists now.21 And it has 
grown stronger in the academy: those who once argued against originalism have 
rebranded themselves “living originalists,”22 while an array of scholars invoke 
“original meanings” to support liberal or libertarian causes.23 It seems 
worthwhile, at this moment in time, to pay attention to originalism—from a 
different perspective—from inside its textual presumptions. 
The critique that follows differs from standard external complaints against 
originalism. Others have claimed that originalism yields unfortunate 
outcomes24—that it embraces racism or excludes women—critiques that over 
time have waned as originalists have written lengthy histories denying such 
claims.25 Still others continue to claim that judges are incapable of historical 
analysis26 or that the Founders themselves were not originalists.27 Others seem 
more resigned, claiming to turn the tables, urging that originalism is really living 
constitutionalism in historical disguise.28 
All of these things may be true but are irrelevant for my argument, which 
is pitched at a higher level of abstraction. I assume, for purposes of this argument, 
originalism’s most basic claim—that the text of the Constitution is the rule of 
law. For decades, this has been the cri de coeurs of originalists who argue that 
judges and their “academic enablers . . . think they can improve upon the original 
 
 18. Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 611–13 (1999) 
(discussing a movement in the 1980s that criticized originalism as unworkable and inconsistent with the 
expectations of the framers). 
 19. Id. at 611 (“The received wisdom among law professors is that originalism is dead . . . .”). 
 20. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (relying on originalist 
reasoning to hold that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms). 
 21. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the 
Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 62 
(2010) (testimony of Elena Kagan). 
 22. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM (2014). 
 23. See, e.g., LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE: PRIVACY AND 
SURVEILLANCE IN A DIGITAL AGE (2016) (applying the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment in 
the context of modern intelligence programs). 
 24. See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010); Strauss, supra note 7. 
 25. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah M. Begley, Originalism and Same-Sex Marriage, 
70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 648 (2016); Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex 
Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2011); McConnell, supra note 7. 
 26. See, e.g., Saul Cornell, “Don’t Know Much About History” The Current Crisis in Second 
Amendment Scholarship, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 657 (2002) (highlighting the flaws in judicial treatment of 
Second Amendment history); Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American 
Constitutionalism, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 523, 524–26 (1995) (noting the tendency of judges to refer to 
problematic historical analysis). 
 27. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 
885 (1985). 
 28. See BALKIN, supra note 22. 
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Constitution . . . .”29 As Randy Barnett writes, “[w]hy care about what the 
Constitution actually says, as opposed to what we might prefer it to say . . . ?”30 
It has also been the cry of many who have argued insistently over executive 
power. To give just one example (more will follow later), consider the grand 
arguments about the “unitary executive,” a concept that has been embraced by 
Justice Scalia in one of his most important dissents and which has produced book 
length treatments.31 Unitary executivists argue that the constitutional text 
demands that the President have hierarchical authority over the executive branch. 
In 1994, Cass Sunstein and Larry Lessig wrote a lengthy article in the 
Columbia Law Review arguing that the originalist claim for a “unitary executive” 
was inconsistent with history; the earliest Congresses exercised discretion to 
shape the executive branch.32 In reply, originalists Steven Calabresi and 
Saikrishna Prakash wrote a very lengthy piece in the Yale Law Journal, 
chastising Sunstein and Lessig for their historical method. The point of 
originalism, Calabresi and Prakash insisted, was not history but text. Calabresi 
and Prakash wrote: “[I]t seems clear that those who wish to understand the 
meaning of a new constitutional text must start with the words of the text and 
then see what their public meaning was at the time they were ratified into law.”33 
In their more recent book length treatment of the unitary executive, Calabresi 
and Christopher Yoo reiterate their argument that historical practice should yield 
to the “text and structure of the Constitution.”34 
Since these claims were made, originalist theory has expanded and become 
more precise. Originalists have expended a good deal of effort distinguishing 
between interpretation and construction of constitutional text.35 As one of the 
leading proponents of this theoretical distinction, Lawrence Solum writes: 
The interpretation-construction distinction, which marks the difference 
between linguistic meaning and legal effect, is much discussed these 
days. I shall argue that the distinction is both real and fundamental—
that it marks a deep difference in two different stages (or moments) in 
 
 29. BARNETT, supra note 12, at 1. 
 30. Id. at 1–2. 
 31. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727, 732 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see CALABRESI 
& YOO, supra note 14. 
 32. Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1 (1994). 
 33. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 2, at 557 (emphasis added). 
 34. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 14, at 8. 
 35. For an early treatment, see BARNETT, supra note 12. Solum defines the “construction zone” 
as the set of issues and cases for which the communicative content of the constitutional text does not 
provide a fully determinate answer—a zone of underdetermination. Lawrence B. Solum, The 
Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95, 108 (2010). By way of analogy, the 
“interpretation zone,” would be the set of issues and outcomes for which the communicative content of 
the text does not provide a determinate (or nearly determinate) outcome. See Heidi Kitrosser, 
Interpretive Modesty, 104 GEO. L.J. 459, 464–66 (2016). 
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the way that legal and political actors process legal texts.36 
Although some originalists have taken issue with the distinction,37 many 
others embrace it. Keith Whittington, for example, has dubbed constitutional 
interpretation essentially “legalistic,” while constitutional construction is 
necessary to resolve linguistic “indeterminacies.”38 Randy Barnett similarly 
supports the interpretation-construction distinction, writing that “[w]hat defines 
originalism as a method of constitutional interpretation is the belief that (a) the 
semantic meaning of the written Constitution was fixed at the time of its 
enactment and that (b) this meaning should be followed by constitutional actors 
until it is properly changed by a written amendment.”39 Even those originalists 
who have sought to distance themselves from “original meaning” as the only 
 
 36. Solum, supra note 35, at 95; see also Solum, supra note 2, at 492–95; Lawrence B. Solum, 
The Unity of Interpretation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 551, 568–77 (2010); Lawrence B. Solum, District of 
Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 923, 971–80 (2009); Lawrence B. Solum, 
Incorporation and Originalist Theory, 18 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 409, 436–38 (2009); Lawrence 
B. Solum, Semantic Originalism (Ill. Pub. Law Research Paper No. 07-24, 2008), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1120244 [https://perma.cc/RC9Y-X84C]. 
 37. See Mitchell N. Berman & Kevin Toh, Pluralistic Nonoriginalism and the Combinability 
Problem, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1739, 1747 n.25 (2013) (referring to Solum’s approach as “an idiosyncratic 
and unnecessary wrinkle that other originalists have not fully appreciated and are unlikely to find 
congenial”); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Pragmatist’s View of Constitutional Implementation and 
Constitutional Meaning, 119 HARV. L. REV. F. 173, 175 (2006) (arguing that no distinction exists where 
“the meaning of a constitutional provision is its implementation”); John O. McGinnis & Michael B. 
Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory of Interpretation and the Case Against 
Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 772–75 (2009) (objecting to the interpretation-construction 
distinction because original interpretive rules offer a plausible way to resolve ambiguity and because 
construction was not embraced by the founders); Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New Originalism, 69 
OHIO ST. L.J. 609, 615–16, 616 n.34 (2008) (citing the interpretation-construction distinction as an 
example of a new originalist distinction that is “hardly intuitive, whose precise application may lead to 
missteps”); see also Laura A. Cisneros, The Constitutional Interpretation/Construction Distinction: A 
Useful Fiction, 27 CONST. COMMENT. 71, 76–80 (2010) (describing differing views about the 
interpretation-construction distinction and concluding that the distinction is “neither obvious nor 
identifiable through the application of an accepted and uniform set of rules”); B. Jessie Hill, Resistance 
to Constitutional Theory: The Supreme Court, Constitutional Change, and the “Pragmatic Moment,” 
91 TEX. L. REV. 1815, 1831 (2013) (observing that the “context dependency of language . . . throws into 
question” the interpretation-construction distinction). 
 38. KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, 
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (1999); see also KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 1–19 (1999). 
 39. Randy E. Barnett, Interpretation and Construction, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 66 
(2011); see also Randy E. Barnett, The Gravitational Force of Originalism, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 411 
(2013) (discussing “New Originalism” and a “gravitational force” that originalism exerts on legal 
doctrine regardless of whether originalism provides the basis for the decision); Randy E. Barnett, The 
Misconceived Assumption About Constitutional Assumptions, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 615, 616 (2009) 
(challenging the assumption that the original meaning of the Constitution is consistent with segregated 
schools or the inferiority of women); Barnett, supra note 18, at 660 (arguing that originalism survived 
the challenges it faced in the 1980s and has become the dominant approach to constitutional 
interpretation). 
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constraint on constitutional interpretation, acknowledge that there is some safe, 
neutral zone of textual meaning.40 
Accepting that textual analysis is the first step in proper constitutional 
approach, I question the neutrality of that first step in what I might call, bowing 
to Lawrence Solum, the “interpretation zone.” Focusing on the field of executive 
power,41 I contend that originalist interpreters of executive power regularly 
misread the Constitution’s text. Not to put too fine a point on it, originalists 
specializing in this field of executive power too often make up their own preferred 
meaning of the text, enriching the text’s meaning with strained inferences. This 
is not true of all originalists,42 but it is certainly true of enough work on 
presidential power that it deserves greater scrutiny. To demonstrate that these are 
in fact additions to meaning, I deploy a “falsification” approach to read the 
Constitution. This approach is both more precise and more faithful to the full 
document. It requires that the interpreter (1) work out what interpreters add, by 
implication, to the text; and (2) work out whether that implication is cancelled 
(falsified) by the rest of the text. If there is more than one implication, the 
interpreter must engage in constitutional “construction,” based on traditional 
pluralist interpretive tools.43 
Call this textual methodology “analytic textualism.” This approach rejects 
the tendency to pull single words or terms from the Constitution out of context 
and put them in an entirely new context to create new meanings. My approach is 
a post-originalist theory in the sense that Scott Soames has described post-
originalism or as Lawrence Solum has elaborated it in his methodological 
writings;44 it claims, like Richard Fallon, that originalists need a better theory of 
textual meaning.45 Unlike Fallon, who contends that there are many possible 
theories of meaning, I argue that any theory of constitutional meaning must 
depend upon basic principles of communication. At a minimum, any asserted 
 
 40. See William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 
1079 (2017). 
 41. It is entirely possible, of course, that this thesis does not apply to other areas of originalist 
thought, such as the meaning of the “commerce power,” Randy E. Barnett, Jack Balkin’s Interaction 
Theory of “Commerce,” 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 623 (2012), or the Second Amendment, Solum, District 
of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, supra note 36. Of course, given that my theory rests on basic 
features of communication, it would be entirely appropriate in future work to test that hypothesis. 
 42. See, e.g., Solum, supra note 2, at 470 (executive power is vague). 
 43. For a discussion of pluralism, see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982) 
(providing a classic elucidation of forms of pluralism); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist 
Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987) (advocating for a 
“constructivist coherence” method of interpretation, which centers on the use of multiple constitutional 
arguments). 
 44. Soames calls his theory deferentialism. Scott Soames, Deferentialism: A Post-Originalist 
Theory of Legal Interpretation, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 597 (2013); see also Lawrence B. Solum, 
Originalist Methodology, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 269 (2017) (articulating an originalist methodology that 
draws on linguistic theories as well as legal theory and emphasizes the role of context in constitutional 
interpretation and construction). 
 45. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for Theories 
of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1241–43 (2015). 
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inference from the text must not be inconsistent with the rest of the Constitution. 
By “inconsistency,” I mean that hypothesized meanings may not be “falsified” 
or “cancelled” by the rest of the Constitution. (In Part II, I explain what I mean 
by “falsify” or “cancel.”) Not only should non-originalists find this welcome but 
so too should originalists. In theory, there is nothing inconsistent with this 
approach to the text and the basic commitments of originalist theory, nor is it 
inconsistent with a more robust version of pluralism.46 My claims are simply 
about the beginning of the analysis, not about what happens when there is no text 
or when the text is ambiguous—something I expect happens in almost every case 
that reaches the Supreme Court. 
If one accepts this approach, one will find that there are no textual answers 
to the “executive power” questions raised here. Because there is no “hard textual 
answer” to these questions, courts must, in my view, turn to standard pluralist 
methods: history, structure, precedent, and consequences to resolve conflicting 
textual interpretations. Pluralism is ancient, reaching back to the Founding,47 but 
it has been incorrectly theorized as a grab bag of approaches rather than as a 
constraint against false hypothesized readings. In fact, a restrained pluralism48 
resists false readings by testing the words against their effects: how the world 
has treated these questions in the past and what has happened because of these 
words in the world, to the Constitution and real life (what Madison called the 
“liquidat[ion]” of meaning).49 This Article does not purport to provide a full 
theory of constitutional interpretation or a full defense of restrained pluralism; it 
takes the first step in that direction by suggesting a previously untheorized 
conception of pluralism as a constraint on false textual enrichment. 
Some will find “analytic textualism’s” approach too narrow, insisting that 
all great theories of the Constitution must depend upon grand political morality. 
There is a problem with this “they go low, we go high” strategy: elitism. One 
reason that originalism has had a real political effect in the world is that its core 
idea—the importance of the constitutional text—speaks to citizens. The idea that 
the Constitution can be read, and presumably understood, by everyone is an 
important element in our constitutional and political culture. To argue that 
constitutional theory must emphasize the Supreme Court’s complex judicial 
 
 46. Originalists, at a minimum, believe in the fixation of text and that text constrains. See 
BENNETT & SOLUM, supra note 5, at 2. Those two commitments are entirely consistent with “analytic 
textualism” based on reading the “whole” text. To the extent I endorse pluralism, which would include 
review of interpretive consequences, my view is unlikely to be viewed as originalism. 
 47. See 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 6. 
 48. I recognize that, for some, this will represent a radical restructuring of the conventional ideas 
of pluralism but, alas, the focus of this Article on executive power does not permit a greater defense than 
provided in Part IV. 
 49. THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 236 (James Madison) (Jacob Ernest Cooke ed., 1961). 
Liquidation of meaning over time is different from early uses of particular texts of the Constitution as a 
kind of lexicon. Liquidation in the sense I am using it here involves the notion that practice over time 
yields real world experiences solidifying a position on an otherwise vague text. An originalist is likely 
to consider the former lexicon use but may not necessarily consider the latter. 
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doctrine,50 or judges who like to make the Constitution “live,”51 or moral 
theorists who want to dictate “right answers,”52 is to imply, even if 
unintentionally, that the Constitution is above the people. The originalist 
insistence on the text of the Constitution is something no citizen is likely to deny. 
Whatever elite courts may do, the power of the Constitution’s text means 
something in everyday American politics. 
The battle that follows will be pitched, in the first parts, at the level of 
words, which will cause some discomfort to those preferring grander theory. 
Academics tend to value high levels of abstraction. They also tend to value 
theories that have little real world potential: throwing the Constitution to the 
winds or holding a new constitutional convention.53 From these perspectives, my 
approach may seem petty, picayune, or insufficiently theoretical. But if the real 
world is fighting at a different pitch, at a level where words constitute bullets, to 
refuse to resist those bullets because it is beneath one’s station is to resign oneself 
to the possibility of grave injury, all the while claiming one is above the battle. 
Given the current state of the Supreme Court, it is unlikely that originalism’s 
jurisprudential gestalt will disappear. Justice Gorsuch will only strengthen that 
tendency in a world that will raise important questions about the exercise of 
presidential power. It is time, then, to test the textual (as opposed to the 
historical) theories upon which originalist theories of executive power are based. 
II. 
SPARSE TEXT, ADDED MEANING 
The most obvious and basic feature of our Constitution is that its text is 
sparse. Economy of expression distinguishes a constitution from a legal code. 
No linguist denies that, faced with skimpy texts, interpreters are likely to 
interpolate or add to the meaning of raw text when seeking to apply the text to a 
particular context. Linguists call these “pragmatic enrichments” or “pragmatic 
inferences.”54 Put more colloquially, interpreters tend to fill in the blanks in any 
communication. It is equally basic that these enrichments are hypothesized 
 
 50. See Strauss, supra note 7. 
 51. STRAUSS, supra note 24. I reject the term “living constitutionalism” as verging on the 
oxymoronic. “Living” suggests instability and constitutionalism denotes stability. This is a very poor 
term to describe what I believe to be the most stable theory of constitutional methodology, pluralism. 
 52. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 185–86, 279–90 (1977) (challenging the 
idea that no “right answer” exists for difficult questions of law and morality). 
 53. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, FRAMED (2012) (arguing that the U.S. Constitution, like 
many state constitutions, warrants updating); LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN, ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
DISOBEDIENCE (2012) (arguing against the view that the Constitution is binding and in favor of 
disobedience). I too value these theories as a legal academic seeking to understand the Constitution’s 
role in a larger polity, but my experience in courts and in politics makes me wonder about their value to 
constitutional law, which has increasingly pitched itself in an entirely different register. 
 54. See generally STEPHEN C. LEVINSON, PRAGMATICS (1983); DEIRDRE WILSON & DAN 
SPERBER, MEANING AND RELEVANCE 3–10 (2012); PERSPECTIVES ON PRAGMATICS AND PHILOSOPHY 
89–90 (Alessandra Capone et al. eds., 2013). 
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meanings—they are not the “actual” meaning of the text but attempts to apply 
the raw text to a particular context, by the addition of meanings. These 
hypothesized, enriched meanings can, in turn, be falsified by consulting new, 
conflicting information. 
A. Meaning, Pragmatic Inference, and Originalism 
Like all forms of communication, the Constitution is economical, using 
relatively few words to convey meaning. All speech is economical in some 
sense—it typically says less than it means.55 I may say to you, “I’ll go get that.” 
The listener will have to rely upon the context of “that” to determine the meaning 
of my communication. 
In linguistics, context adds meaning and is typically considered to add 
meaning by “pragmatic inference.”56 So, for example, if I say “fifth” and the 
interpreter assumes that I am referring to the “Fifth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution,” she has “enriched” the meaning by adding a legal context. 
Literally, the term “fifth” could mean any number of things, from the fifth 
linebacker to a fifth of gin, depending upon whether I was at a football game or 
in a liquor store. Specifying some features of context does not eliminate the 
potential for pragmatic enrichment. If we all know that I am saying “fifth” in a 
legal context, without further clarification, I could still mean anything from the 
fifth paragraph in a contract to the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution or the 
fifth Article of the U.S. Code. 
For purposes of this Article, I will use the term “pragmatic inference” or 
“pragmatic enrichment” to mean the kind of addition to meaning that 
philosophers of language describe when they talk about interpretation. The 
linguistic philosopher Scott Soames offers the following example to show how 
even the most basic of terms may need additional information to precisify 
meaning: “Matriculated students are allowed to take five courses.”57 At the 
semantic level, this statement does not tell us whether the term “five” means 
exactly five, at least five, at most five, or other contextually determined qualifiers 
of “five.”58 If the interpreter adds “exactly” or “at least,” they are adding meaning 
separate and apart from the term “five.” Linguists, such as Kent Bach, call this 
form of interpretation by the name “impliciture,” on the theory that the 
interpreter adds meaning already implicit in the expression. Other linguists 
 
 55. See, e.g., WILSON & SPERBER, supra note 54, at 10–12 (explaining how implicatures and 
explicatures communicate meaning beyond what the speaker has said). 
 56. See STEPHEN C. LEVINSON, PRESUMPTIVE MEANINGS: THE THEORY OF GENERALIZED 
CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE 20–22 (2000) (arguing that interpreters add meanings to semantic 
content based on generalized assumptions); see also PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF WORDS 
(1989) (establishing the basis for Grice’s theory of language, including his theory of pragmatic 
implicature). 
 57. Scott Soames, Drawing the Line Between Meaning and Implicature—and Relating Both to 
Assertion, 42 NOÛS 440, 451 (2008). 
 58. Id. at 451–53. 
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purporting to follow or reject the work of Paul Grice might use the names 
“implicature” or “explicature.”59 For my purposes, internecine debates within 
linguistics about these terms matter less than the notion that contextual 
enrichment occurs by inference due to the economy of expression. Pragmatic 
inference is not a linguistically controversial practice. Contending camps within 
linguistics, semanticists and pragmatists, have embraced this idea.60 
Lest this seem orthogonal to originalism, some theorists of originalism have 
embraced the notion that pragmatic enrichment is part of interpretation, a part 
that precedes any “construction” of vague terms.61 In short, they have posited 
that there is some space where meaning is clear and can be precisified by 
historical example or definitions,62 even if there exists a large, and capacious, 
role for courts to play in constitutional construction—in cases where the 
Constitution’s words are cavernous and aspirational (i.e. “due process of law,” 
“equal protection of the law”). Originalists debate the scope of constitutional 
construction and even the distinction between interpretation and construction,63 
but, as a general rule, they theorize that there is a space where interpretation 
yields meanings that determine or nearly determine legal content. Call this the 
“interpretation zone.” Even those theorists, like Will Baude and Stephen Sachs, 
who question whether public meaning can do all “originalist” work and seek 
constraint in canons of construction, posit a realm of easy cases where meaning 
 
 59. See Kent Bach, The Top 10 Misconceptions About Implicature, in DRAWING THE 
BOUNDARIES OF MEANING: NEO-GRICEAN STUDIES IN PRAGMATICS AND SEMANTICS IN HONOR OF 
LAURENCE R. HORN 21 (Betty J. Birner & Gregory Ward eds., 2006). “Implicature” comes from Grice, 
although now it is a term of art accepted, if contested, by a variety of linguists. See, e.g., Laurence R. 
Horn, Implicature, in THE HANDBOOK OF PRAGMATICS 3 (Laurence R. Horn & Gregory Ward eds., 
2004); YAN HUANG, PRAGMATICS 25–83 (2d ed. 2014) (discussing various theories of implicature, 
including Gricean and neo-Gricean pragmatic theories). “Explicature” is associated with Wilson and 
Sperber’s relevance theory. See WILSON & SPERBER, supra note 54, at 160. None of these theorists deny 
that contextual enrichment occurs by inference due to economy of expression. 
 60. See, e.g., JAMES R. HURFORD, BRENDAN HEASLEY & MICHAEL B. SMITH, SEMANTICS: A 
COURSEBOOK 260–326 (2d ed. 2007); NICK RIEMER, INTRODUCING SEMANTICS 118–20 (2010); JOHN 
I. SAEED, SEMANTICS 210–19 (4th ed. 2016); see also WILLIAM G. LYCAN, PHILOSOPHY OF 
LANGUAGE: A CONTEMPORARY INTRODUCTION 165 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing the importance of 
context and noting that pragmatics is “about the functioning of language in context”); CONCISE 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE AND LINGUISTICS 308–21 (Alex Barber & Robert J. 
Stainton eds., 2010) (discussing the prevailing approaches to implicature); KEY IDEAS IN LINGUISTICS 
AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 86–92 (Siobhan Chapman & Christopher Routledge eds., 2009) 
(discussing implicature generally). 
 61. See e.g., Solum, supra note 44, at 278, 286–92; Lawrence B. Solum, Intellectual History as 
Constitutional Theory, 101 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1125–28 (2015). 
 62. Solum, supra note 44, at 278 (“[I]nterpretation is a factual inquiry that yields 
communicative content, whereas construction is a norm-guided activity that yields constitutional 
doctrines, decisions in constitutional cases, and constitutionally salient actions by officials.”); see also 
John Mikhail, The Constitution and the Philosophy of Language: Entailment, Implicature, and Implied 
Powers, 101 VA. L. REV. 1063 (2015) (employing Gricean principles to understand what powers the 
Constitution vests in the federal government); Ryan C. Williams, The Ninth Amendment as a Rule of 
Construction, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 498 (2011) (arguing that the Ninth Amendment should be read as a 
precise and limited rule of construction). 
 63. McGinnis & Rappaport, supra note 37. 
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can be determined by dictionaries, history, or through the application of 
canons.64 
My claim here is not that such a place does not exist, but that, if there is a 
neutral “interpretation zone,” it does not resolve many important constitutional 
questions on executive power. No one doubts, for example, that each state elects 
two Senators, but that question is easy and not likely to be contested in the future. 
Precisely because the Constitution is so sparse in its terms, it requires enriched 
hypothesized meanings to answer real life problems, and because it requires such 
hypothesized, additional meanings, one must fear that the scope of a neutral, 
interpretation zone is quite small. If the examples I offer below are correct, they 
show that in a large range of cases involving executive power—from the removal 
power, to the Emoluments Clause, to the President’s power to refuse to enforce 
law—originalist interpreters have not applied the actual text. They have added 
hypothesized text that can be, and often is, falsified by the rest of the 
Constitution. 
Some originalists will no doubt object that I am confusing interpretation 
and construction zones. Lawrence Solum, for example, has written that the very 
meaning of “executive power” is vague and thus its application to borderline 
cases requires some method of constitutional “construction.”65 But originalists 
specializing in executive power have taken precisely the opposite line, declaring 
the text to be clear or clearly capable of interpretation.66 As noted above, they 
openly and fervently reject historical evidence in favor of text. I do not disagree 
with Solum that what is involved here is “construction”; I do disagree with the 
vast amount of work that has been written assuming that questions about 
executive power—from non-enforcement to removal to emoluments—sits in a 
neutral, norm-free, “interpretation zone.” 
B. Pragmatic Inference, Linguistics, and Cancellation 
History, if nothing else, shows that the Supreme Court makes important, 
and perhaps crucial, inferences embellishing the actual, constitutional text. One 
of the most revered Supreme Court opinions—McCulloch v. Maryland67—
explains the process of pragmatic inference. The question there was the meaning 
of the “Necessary and Proper” clause.68 Chief Justice John Marshall wrote that 
the term “necessary” has no “fixed” character, but “admits of all degrees of 
 
 64. Baude & Sachs, supra note 40, at 1143 (“[T]he easy cases . . . seem easy because a particular 
theory has become second nature . . . . It’s an easy case . . . that a new criminal statute takes the laws of 
duress or accessory liability as it finds them.”). 
 65. Solum, supra note 2, at 470. Solum argues that “construction” occurs when one moves from 
semantic content to legal effect. 
 66. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 14; Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 2, at 557; Calabresi & 
Rhodes, supra note 14; Lawson & Moore, supra note 14. 
 67. 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
 68. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18. 
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comparison.”69 Those comparisons are provided by “other words” that “increase 
or diminish” the urgency of the matter: a thing may be “necessary, very 
necessary, absolutely or indispensably necessary.”70 
Without saying so, Chief Justice Marshall has explained the principle of 
pragmatic inference, noting that the term “necessary” is only precisified by 
adding modifiers, modifiers that clarify meaning. In other words, Chief Justice 
Marshall is identifying a range of potential pragmatic enrichments. Chief Justice 
Marshall highlights that the state of Maryland is making an inference when it 
argues that the term “necessary” means “absolutely” necessary. Chief Justice 
Marshall rejects that addition of meaning, referring to another clause in the 
Constitution which does, in fact, use the term “absolutely necessary” to limit the 
power of states to impose taxes on imports.71 
In this opinion, then, Chief Justice Marshall shows us what philosophers of 
language call pragmatic inference—additions made to precisify text—but he 
gestures as well to the notion that the whole text may add information relevant 
to the purported pragmatic addition.72 In philosophical linguistics, this idea is 
captured more precisely by the idea of “cancelling” a pragmatic inference, a 
phenomenon that the linguistic philosopher Paul Grice first identified.73 
Cancellation means that new information may “cancel” the original purported 
pragmatic enrichment. One common example is that of the “professor, writing a 
letter of recommendation for a job candidate,” who writes only that her student’s 
“command of English is excellent, and his attendance in class has been 
regular.”74 The implication—technically, an implicature—is that the candidate 
is not terribly qualified, even if the letter does not literally say that. That added 
implication can be “cancelled” if the letter writer continues and says, “and she 
received the best score on her exam.” The original pragmatic inference (she is 
not a very good student) is cancelled by the addition of information (she scored 
high on the exam). Another common example involves “a stranded motorist 
seeking help.” The motorist says, “I’m out of gas,” and the response is: “There 
is a gas station around the corner.” This implicates a presupposition that the gas 
station is “open for business.” That implicated presupposition, however, can be 
negated or cancelled by additional information—“but the gas station is closed.” 
If this is correct, it is possible that purported inferences obtained from sparse or 
 
 69. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 414. 
 70. Id. (emphasis added). 
 71. Id. 
 72. For a commanding analysis of all of Chief Justice Marshall’s intertextual moves, see Amar, 
supra note 6, at 749–58. As I explain in Part IV, intratextual analyses can fall prey to purported 
enrichments as well. 
 73. LEVINSON, supra note, 54, at 114 (“[Grice] isolates five characteristic properties of which 
the first, and perhaps the most important, is that they are cancellable, or more exactly defeasible.”). For 
its application in constitutional analysis, see Mikhail, supra note 62, at 1073–75. 
 74. Soames, supra note 57, at 442. 
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partial texts can, in fact, be falsified by adding to the information economy (i.e. 
consulting more text).75 
Critics might argue that relying upon Grice’s work raises problems: 
Controversy surrounds Grice’s theory of conversational maxims. Nothing in my 
argument depends, however, upon the validity or multiple reinterpretations of 
Gricean maxims. Even linguists who reject those maxims, or reconceive them 
entirely, accept the concepts of “pragmatic inference” and “cancellation.”76 As 
one linguist I spoke to said, “no one denies the idea of pragmatic enrichment.”77 
Similarly, there is a consensus about “cancellation,”78 which is to say, the basic 
concept that what we add by pragmatic enrichment may be negated by further 
information in “full” communication. These ideas are well accepted by a wide 
variety of linguists.79 In this Article, I generalize from these more technical 
concepts to consider how interpreters “enrich” meaning, how those 
“enrichments” may be contested or inconsistent with competing enrichments, 
and in some cases, how the full text explicitly cancels or negates these 
enrichments. 
Some may object that we should not view the Constitution as a conversation 
because it is a formal document, a document meant to cohere in ways different 
from daily conversation. That idea resonates with originalists and textualists who 
regard the Constitution as a contract.80 That idea is wrong, in my view,81 but 
irrelevant to the claims made here. Even if one conceives of the Constitution as 
a contract, it is not a secret contract, hidden from the people. As long as we think 
that the Constitution communicates, we should accept the idea that it is likely to 
be read in ways similar to other communications. One of the signature qualities 
of our Constitution is brevity; there is no reason, then, to reject the notion that 
interpreters will add meaning by pragmatic inference82 to the constitutional text. 
Even if one believes that the Constitution is somehow immune from 
principles governing language more generally, enrichment, contested 
enrichment, and cancellation remain relevant to any internal critique of 
originalist theories. Richard Fallon has argued that there are various legal 
“meanings” of “meaning” used by lawyers that may not track semantic or 
linguistic meaning. For Fallon, since “meaning” is itself a matter of contention, 
 
 75. Id. at 443. 
 76. See Mikhail, supra note 62, at 1073–75; supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
 77. Nick Allott, University of Oslo. 
 78. See Mikhail, supra note 62, 1073–75 (discussing a common example of the distinction 
between implication and entailment, including a discussion of cancellation). 
 79. See, e.g., LEVINSON, supra note 54, at 114; WILSON & SPERBER, supra note 54, at 309–12 
(discussing the concepts implied from the context and their cancellation). 
 80. See Baude & Sachs, supra note 40. 
 81. And in the view of other scholars. See, e.g., Barnett, The Misconceived Assumption About 
Constitutional Assumptions, supra note 39, at 616 (criticizing “a mistaken conflation of constitutions 
and contracts”). 
 82. Some originalists, like Larry Solum, agree with the idea that interpretation includes 
pragmatic inferences. See Solum, supra note 35. 
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originalist claims cannot safely find constraint in original meanings.83 I agree 
with Fallon’s claims that language is not enough to resolve great constitutional 
cases, but the problem lies deeper than ambiguities about “meaning.” Even if one 
assumes a unified definition of meaning, given the linguistic economy of the 
Constitution, interpreters will be forced to add meaning by “pragmatic 
enrichment” to resolve particular controversies. This move can occur under any 
theory of meaning—intended meaning, reasonable meaning, or dictionary 
meaning. As we will see, the very choice of a relevant text is itself capable of 
yielding pragmatic enrichment. That choice and the potential for enrichment, 
both in theory and in practice, occurs before the application of history or canons 
of constitutional construction. To use McCulloch as an example, if one enriches 
the term “necessary” with the idea of “absolute” necessity, and then looks to 
original public meaning or canons of construction to confirm that meaning, one 
is simply confirming the interpreters’ added meaning, not the actual, 
underdetermined, meaning of the constitutional text. 
III. 
ENRICHING EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE POWER 
Now that I have introduced the concepts of enrichment, contested 
enrichment, and cancellation, let me generalize and apply these ideas to some of 
the Supreme Court’s most famous cases on executive power. I begin with an 
opinion written by a liberal textualist, Justice Hugo Black, and then turn to one 
written by a conservative textualist, Justice Scalia. In both cases, the opinions 
depend upon purported pragmatic enrichments—additions to the text, not the 
actual text—that are contested and may be cancelled by the full text. In Part IV, 
I turn to contemporary constitutional controversies to show how this interpretive 
tendency affects scholarly treatments of the removal power, the Emoluments 
Clause, and the President’s power to refuse to enforce the law. 
A. A Liberal Textualist Argument and Its Pragmatic Enrichment 
In a number of cases, the Justices have been asked to consider the extent of 
the President’s executive authority. In the most famous of these cases, 
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Black, a liberal textualist, 
urged that President Harry Truman could not seize domestic steel mills because 
he was exercising “legislative” rather than “executive” power.84 As Justice Black 
wrote: “The Constitution limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the 
recommending of laws [the President] thinks wise and the vetoing of the laws he 
thinks bad.”85 As many critics of the Black opinion have noted, executive 
agencies engage in “lawmaking” every day—they issue regulations—and the 
 
 83. See Fallon, supra note 45. 
 84. 343 U.S. 579, 587–88 (1952). 
 85. Id. at 587. 
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President issues executive orders. If the President makes law in these ways, the 
critic asks: Why cannot the President exercise “legislative power” with respect 
to the steel mills?86 
Justice Black’s argument depends on a pragmatic enrichment of the text, 
not the actual text. Justice Black quotes the Vesting Clause of Article I, “All 
legislative Powers herein granted . . . ,” and the Necessary and Proper Clause’s 
reference to “all Laws.”87 He explains those texts, however, by writing that 
Congress has “exclusive constitutional authority to make laws necessary and 
proper to carry out the powers vested by the Constitution.”88 Note that the 
Constitution does not say that Congress has exclusive legislative authority. 
Exclusivity is Justice Black’s pragmatic enrichment. That pragmatic enrichment 
occurs because the interpreter has focused on a very small part of the text—
“all”—wrenching it from its immediate context. Even if we open the textual 
frame just a few more words, we can see that the text of Article I, Section 1 itself 
denies that the Congress has “all” legislative power since it limits “legislative” 
power to those powers “herein granted.”89 Congress has enumerated legislative 
powers, not every power that could possibly be deemed “legislative.” 
Notice, as well, that Justice Black picked particular texts to support his 
argument, to the exclusion of other constitutional texts. This very choice, the 
isolation of a word or clause, puts a thumb on the scale on one side of the 
interpretive question, privileging and ignoring other text. Not surprisingly, the 
President’s lawyers chose a different text, relying upon “the executive power” in 
Article II, to support precisely the opposite conclusion that the President can, in 
fact, use his executive power to seize the steel mills.90 Thus we see that the choice 
of text here has crucial consequences for the decision: if you pick the “legislative 
power,” like Justice Black, the interpreter rejects the President’s decision as 
unconstitutional; if you pick the “executive power,” like the dissenters, the 
interpreter affirms the President’s decision as constitutional. Whether one calls 
this “interpretation” or “construction,” it seems rather clear that the very 
“choice” of text matters to the ultimate decision of the case. If that is correct, 
 
 86. See Edward S. Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53 COLUM. 
L. REV. 53, 64 (1953) (criticizing the doctrine as stated in Justice Black’s opinion as “a purely arbitrary 
construct”); Paul G. Kauper, The Steel Seizure Case: Congress, the President and the Supreme Court, 
51 MICH. L. REV. 141, 180–81 (1952) (criticizing Justice Black’s opinion because “it is doubtful whether 
such a clear and sharp distinction between legislative and executive functions can always be drawn”); 
see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in Separation 
of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 23–24 (1998) (discussing the differing formalist and 
functionalist views among the Justices in Steel Seizure); Joseph Landau, Chevron Meets Youngstown: 
National Security and the Administrative State, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1917, 1925–26 (2012) (noting Justice 
Black’s opinion but discussing lawmaking as a function of administrative agencies). 
 87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 88. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 588–89 (emphasis added). 
 89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1. 
 90. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 587. 
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then originalists and textualists must have a theory of the choice of text if they 
are to establish a neutral interpretive zone. 
B. Contesting Justice Black’s Pragmatic Enrichments of “Legislative” 
Power 
Opening the window to other texts allows us to test whether Justice Black’s 
purported “pragmatic enrichment” is a contested enrichment, including whether 
looking at the whole text negates or cancels91 Justice Black’s enrichment. That 
Article I limits itself to enumerated powers “herein granted” challenges the 
notion of exclusivity, where exclusivity means that “every imaginable 
legislative-type power” is given to Congress.92 Article I also challenges the 
notion suggested by exclusivity that only Congress holds legislative power. 
Article I gives the President power to veto legislation.93 In other words, the 
President and the Congress share this most important “legislative power”—they 
must agree on all legislation. Lest one still insist on “exclusivity” as a proper 
pragmatic enrichment, any student of the full Constitution knows that the 
President and the Senate “share” power in many important matters, including 
appointments to the executive, appointments to the judiciary, and the treaty 
power.94 
The full text of the Constitution thus negates Justice Black’s enriched 
meaning—that the Congress has exclusive legislative power. This may well 
explain why Justice Black’s interpretation has not held up well over time, and 
Justice Robert Jackson’s concurrence offers a powerful rejoinder. Justice 
Jackson’s famous tripartite test depends upon the idea of “shared power” as a 
baseline. When the President and Congress agree, says Justice Jackson, the 
President has the greatest power; when they disagree, each must rely upon its 
own powers.95 The model here is Article I, Section 7, the Bicameralism Clause, 
which provides for Congressional passage and Presidential veto.96 When the 
 
 91. One might argue that to fully “cancel” a pragmatic inference, there must be precise semantic 
content directly contrary to the inference. If the inference is “she is a bad student,” cancellation requires 
the precise semantic content that “she is a good student.” The question of cancellation may then hang 
upon how one expresses the pragmatic inference. In Justice Black’s case, the inference is exclusivity; 
cancellation would, under this approach, require that the Constitution expressly state, “legislative power 
is not exclusive.” My own view is that this is too narrow a view of cancellation. For example, the 
Constitution does not say “legislative power is not exclusive,” but it does grant legislative power (the 
veto) to the President. Put in other words, the Constitution does what the enrichment denies. This 
explains my use of the term “negation.” 
 92. The powers assigned to Congress do not only exist in Article I: In Article III, for example, 
the Congress is given power to create lower courts and to define the Supreme Court’s appellate 
jurisdiction, U.S. CONST. art. III; similarly, Article IV allows Congress the power to regulate territories, 
U.S. CONST. art. IV. 
 93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2–3. 
 94. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (appointments and treaty power shared with the Senate). 
 95. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 635–37 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 96. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United 
2018] RECLAIMING THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT 21 
branches agree, there is law; when not, there is only a bill or a presidential 
statement. Justice Jackson’s “shared power” view and the texts that support 
“shared power” (the Appointments Clause and the Bicameralism Clause97) 
negate one version of Justice Black’s interpretation—that Article I legislative 
powers are “exclusive.” Despite Justice Jackson’s overt anti-textualism,98 his 
opinion depends upon a fuller and more accurate view of the constitutional text, 
even if the choice of executive-legislative agreement as a safe harbor is itself a 
contestable proposition. 
Notice that the dissenting Justices, like Chief Justice Fred Vinson, also rely 
upon pragmatic enrichment. Chief Justice Vinson writes that the President has 
“the whole of the” executive power.99 Again, we see pragmatic enrichment: the 
text of the Constitution says “the” executive power, not “the whole of the” 
executive power. In his concurrence, Justice Jackson rejected this argument 
rather quickly, explaining that the dissenters had added to the text of the 
Constitution.100 He went on to conclude that Article II negated Chief Justice 
Vinson’s (and the government’s) interpretation since there would be no need to 
enumerate any particular executive powers—such as the commander-in-chief 
power—if, in fact, the Vesting Clause granted “all” or “the whole” executive 
power to the President.101 
To sum up, we have seen how major Steel Seizure opinions depend upon 
pragmatic inference. Justice Black reads Article I as vesting “all” legislative 
power in the Congress, but the Constitution does not say that.102 The dissenting 
Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed and Minton read Article II as vesting 
“the whole” executive power in the President, but the Constitution does not say 
that, either. Justice Jackson offers a more complex interpretation, acknowledging 
what appears a logical contradiction but textual truth: that the Constitution both 
requires, in some cases, that the President and Congress act together and at the 
 
States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in 
which it shall have originated . . . .”). 
 97. Id.; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent 
of the Senate . . . [to] appoint . . . all other Officers of the United States . . . .”). 
 98. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (“The actual art of governing under 
our Constitution does not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches 
based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from context.”). 
 99. Id. at 681 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 100. Id. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 101. As Professor Steven Calabresi once argued, the notion that Article I powers are limited to 
those “herein granted” can be seen by negative implication (its absence from Article II) as suggesting a 
more capacious field for executive power. Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 14, at 1175–76. Here, 
however, I am simply describing Supreme Court cases and their interpretive focus, rather than 
considering all forms of linguistic argument in the case of executive power. For an analysis of the more 
complex textual arguments made by unitary executivists, see infra Part IV. 
 102. The Constitution provides for “[a]ll legislative Powers herein granted . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. 
1, § 1. 
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same time provides, in other cases, independent power to each department. This 
is by far the safer and more precise interpretation.103 
C. Justice Scalia’s Pragmatic Enrichment in Morrison v. Olson 
Justice Black, a liberal, is hardly the only constitutional textualist who has 
enriched the meaning of central phrases in the Constitution. Consider Justice 
Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v. Olson, the independent counsel case, a dissent 
whose conclusion I applaud104 but whose pronouncements on the meaning of the 
text are just as easily seen to be additions to the text, again negated by the full 
text. 
The independent counsel law permitted Congress to submit a request to the 
Attorney General to name a “special counsel” to investigate misconduct in the 
executive department. In the post-Watergate era, proponents insisted that the 
executive branch should not have the power to investigate itself; there should be 
an “independent” investigator. More specifically, Theodore Olson’s case 
involved allegations of false testimony before Congress by a high-ranking 
Department of Justice official. The specific question was the constitutionality of 
the independent counsel law, a very complex statute making it rather easy for the 
Congress to investigate executive department personnel based on claims of false 
testimony before Congress. 
The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, upheld 
the law on the basis that the independent counsel had not “unduly 
trammel[ed] . . . executive authority” because her job was not “so central to the 
functioning of the Executive Branch.”105 The idea, presumably, was that the 
independent counsel was one prosecutor among many in the Justice Department, 
and her prosecution of a government employee would not bring the executive 
 
 103. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wilson C. Nicholas (Sept. 7, 1803), in 41 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 346, 347 (Barbara B. Oberg ed., 2014) (“When an instrument admits two 
constructions the one safe, the other dangerous, the one precise the other indefinite, I prefer that which 
is safe & precise.”). The implicit argument here, which awaits greater explication, is that an explanation 
that includes more text is by definition better than an explication that includes less text. 
 104. Justice Scalia’s opinion deserves recognition not because of its formalism but because of its 
implicit understanding that the statute allowed members of Congress too much power to send their 
political enemies to jail. Under the law, Congress could initiate an investigation, which the Attorney 
General had no real power to resist. A Congress upset with an official could simply threaten to ask the 
Attorney General for an investigation, and given the difficulty of denying that investigation (the 
Attorney General had to find that there was “no” reason to investigate), Congress could be fairly sure 
that it had the power to call any of its political enemies to court under threat of criminal indictment. 
Somehow, this was never very clear to liberals until Republicans used this tactic against President 
Clinton: Independent Counsel Ken Starr found Clinton lied about an affair under oath, leading to a failed 
impeachment. Put in other words, Justice Scalia was prescient about the statute’s incentives and 
operation, its consequentialist, as opposed to formalist, dangers. Victoria Nourse, The Vertical 
Separation of Powers, 49 DUKE L.J. 749, 772–76 (1999); see also Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Independent 
Counsel Statute: Bad Law, Bad Policy, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 463, 471–74 (1996) (discussing the role 
of politics in application of the statute); Julie R. O’Sullivan, The Interaction Between Impeachment and 
the Independent Counsel Statute, 86 GEO. L.J. 2193, 2195 (1998). 
 105. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988). 
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branch to a halt. In linguistic terms, the Rehnquist approach enriches the text 
suggesting that “the executive power” means “not unduly trammeled” executive 
power. Justice Scalia’s response to this enrichment quite properly noted that 
“unduly trammeled” appears nowhere in the text of the Constitution. 
Because of textual economy, both sides of the case ended up enriching the 
actual constitutional text. For Justice Scalia, “all” executive power must reside 
in the hands of the President. Here are his precise words: “To repeat, Article II, 
§ 1, cl. 1, of the Constitution provides: ‘The executive Power shall be vested in 
a President of the United States.’ As I described at the outset of this opinion, this 
does not mean some of the executive power, but all of the executive power.”106 
Again, note the pragmatic enrichment: all of the executive power.107 As Justice 
Scalia noted, no one doubted that the independent counsel was exercising 
executive power as a prosecutor. It follows then, for him, that the counsel was 
violating the Constitution because the President must have “all” executive 
power; at the very least, the President must have the power to remove those 
exercising executive power.108 
D. Contesting Justice Scalia’s Pragmatic Enrichment 
Like Justice Black’s enrichment, Justice Scalia’s is negated by the 
constitutional text as a whole. As others have written, Justice Scalia’s view of 
the Vesting Clause’s “grant of executive power” is “a grant of exclusive 
control.”109 As Justice Jackson explained in Steel Seizure, the Constitution does 
not say “all” executive power; it says “the” executive power.110 Second, if “all” 
means “exclusive,” the President’s veto power exists in Article I, which would 
seem to make of it, what Justice Black called it—a “legislative” power,111 even 
if held in the hands of the executive. Moreover, the President does not have “all” 
power to appoint his subordinates; he shares that power with the Senate, under 
the Appointments Clause.112 Whether we like it or not, the constitutional text 
does not create simple, hermetically sealed categories of power. 
 
 106. Id. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 107. As Larry Lessig and Cass Sunstein as well as other scholars have noted, this is supposed to 
be a textual argument: a “strongly unitary executive is grounded in the Vesting Clause of Article II: ‘The 
executive Power shall be vested in a President.’” Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 9–10. Lessig and 
Sunstein are speaking here of the “unitary executive” as a theory that puts the President on top of a 
hierarchical executive branch. In theory, that is a different claim than that the President has “all” 
executive power. 
 108. This is not a particularly tendentious view of the case. See, e.g., David M. Driesen, Toward 
a Duty-Based Theory of Executive Power, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 76 (2009) (“Justice Scalia’s dissent 
relied on the proposition that the President possesses ‘all’ executive power under the Constitution. This 
idea, Scalia argues, stems from the Vesting Clause, Article II, Section 1, Clause 1 . . . .”). 
 109. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 110. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 640–41 (Jackson, J. concurring). 
 111. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 112. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
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Of course, the claim here is more complex. Justice Scalia may say “all” 
executive power, but very few scholars are willing to accept that this means the 
President can do anything he wants as long as he calls it “executive power.”113 
In Morrison, Scalia is using pragmatic enrichment to argue about a specific 
statute and a specific constitutional problem. He believes that the President has 
“all” power in the sense of hierarchical authority over the executive branch; 
therefore, Congress cannot create “independent” entities within the executive 
branch. Put in its narrowest compass, Justice Scalia’s reading of the text is that 
“all power” means the power to remove “all” executive officers. Of course, as 
any student of the “removal power” knows, the Constitution says nothing at all 
about the removal power. And, as a result, the removal question has bedeviled 
Presidents and the Supreme Court since the Founding, leading to some of the 
more memorable constitutional clashes, including impeachment controversies, 
in American history.114 
To sum up, there is no textual answer to the removal question facing the 
Court in Morrison v. Olson.115 There are only textual arguments that put the 
thumb on the scale in one direction or another by pragmatic enrichment. The real 
issues here lurk behind this veil of linguistic legerdemain. Chief Justice 
Rehnquist upheld the independent counsel law because he feared any other ruling 
would mean that all independent agencies—from the Federal Reserve Board to 
the Securities and Exchange Commission—would become unconstitutional (a 
fear that was highly overstated, since the independent counsel could have been 
easily distinguished based on the power it gave to Congress). Justice Scalia, 
fearful that Congress was using the independent counsel law to punish political 
opponents, was correct about the result but much too confident that what he was 
applying was in fact the text of the Constitution (“all” executive power) rather 
than his personal addition to the text of the Constitution. 
E. False Pragmatic Enrichment, the Creation of Hard-Edged Rules, and 
Consequences 
Once one actually pays attention to what seem like small interpretive 
additions to the Constitution’s text, one can see why these interpretations are 
attractive. Pragmatic inferences are often terms that appear to have quantitative 
references—all, exclusive, only, exactly, whole. Such added terms are likely to 
be particularly attractive because they appear objective and hard-edged. They 
create bright line rules. Notice, however, that it is pragmatic enrichment that is 
 
 113. See, e.g., Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 14, at 1177 n.119 (noting that unitary executivists 
do not believe that Article II confers inherent power to act without a statute); Christopher S. Yoo, Steven 
G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945–2004, 90 IOWA 
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in an inherent authority to act contra legem). 
 114. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 14, at 174–89 (discussing the impeachment of Andrew 
Johnson). 
 115. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). 
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adding the hardness, the lines, and not the constitutional text. There is a linguistic 
pattern here, and it should not go without notice. We will see it again in the next 
Part, which turns to the unitary executive, the non-enforcement power, and the 
Emoluments Clause. 
One of the risks of this kind of small, almost unnoticed addition, is that it 
raises the possibility that the interpreter has added a hard-edged pragmatic 
inference—not because this is the best interpretation of the text, or even the 
historically proper one (the interpreter has not at this stage even referred to 
history)—but because of the interpreter’s policy preferences. Judicial decision-
making, like any other decision-making, can be motivated decision-making, 
which is to say it has a tendency toward confirmation bias.116 Let us say, for 
example, one believes in a powerful Presidency and is skeptical of government 
bureaucracy, then one might easily find oneself adding a very small word, “all” 
in front of “executive power,” convinced that one is applying the constitutional 
text even if this is not in fact the text of the Constitution. Reverse the political 
presumption: assume one is fearful that the President will take on too much 
power. It is not too hard to imagine the interpreter almost unconsciously adding 
the word “all” to legislative power as Justice Black did to support his claim that 
the President was legislating. In neither case is the interpreter using the actual 
text of the Constitution. Instead, in apparently small—but absolutely crucial—
ways, the interpreter is injecting the interpreter’s preferences into the text of the 
Constitution, justifying it all the while by the hard edges the interpreter has 
herself added to the text. 
As we will see in Part IV, there is more at stake here than a few small words. 
On these words hangs much. I hope no Justice or constitutionalist really believes 
that the President has “all” power. But large consequences can depend upon the 
misuse of language in judicial opinions. We all know the history of the Bush 
administration’s use of these theories in the War on Terror, when the Office of 
Legal Counsel wrote opinions that appeared to assume that the President did in 
fact have “all” executive power.117 When in doubt, lawyers will look at these 
phrases and wonder just how far they can push the meaning of “executive 
power.” This is not a matter of mere theory; liberals and conservatives have cited 
the phrase “all” executive power in dissents and majority opinions in the 
Supreme Court both before and after Morrison.118 The good news is that it is not 
 
 116. See VICTORIA NOURSE, MISREADING LAW, MISREADING DEMOCRACY 103–34 (2016) 
(detailing the cognitive risks of interpretation). 
 117. Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t 
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President”); Morrison, 487 U.S. at 705 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that “Article II, § 1, cl. 1, of the 
Constitution provides: ‘The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States’” and 
that “this does not mean some of the executive power, but all of the executive power”); Youngstown 
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actually the text of the Constitution; the bad news is that too few seem to have 
noticed. 
IV. 
EMOLUMENTS, REMOVAL, AND THE NON-ENFORCEMENT POWER 
Pragmatic enrichment is not limited to judicial opinions. Textualist and 
originalist scholars who write about executive power engage in similar processes 
of textual insemination, injecting their preferred inferences and purposes into the 
constitutional text. In this Part, I consider various controversies about executive 
power—from the President’s power to refuse to enforce the law to the 
Emoluments Clause—to show how originalist claims about executive power 
depend upon pragmatic enrichment of the text (in short, deviations from the 
actual text). Most importantly, I focus on the choice of text, which particular 
word or words are chosen for interpretation. Choice is important here because it 
precedes any pragmatic enrichment. Textualism, as currently practiced, requires 
that one pick a relevant applicable clause, or clauses, or paragraphs. That unit of 
analysis, as we will see, can yield apparent pragmatic enrichments that may be 
false—or at least falsifiable—by opening up the textual economy, by giving full 
faith to the full text. Moreover, as we will see, this isolationist method tends to 
yield falsely precise results by adding hard-edged terms or suggesting all-or-
nothing results. By limiting the information economy to a few words or isolating 
a particular word, textualists and originalists have assumed a methodology that 
forces them to add and subtract information to make sense of any text. 
A. The Foreign Emoluments Clause 
Consider the now-important battle over the otherwise ignored Foreign 
Emoluments Clause. The Constitution states: “no person holding any Office of 
Profit or Trust under [the United States], shall, without the Consent of the 
Congress, accept any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, 
from any King, Prince, or foreign State.”119 Long before this issue arose as a 
public question with regard to the current President, scholars had staked out 
positions on this matter.120 At least one constitutional textualist/originalist 
 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 681 (1952) (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]he 
whole of the ‘executive Power’ is vested in the President”). 
 119. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (“No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: 
And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the 
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 120. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 182 (2005) 
(“[T]he more general language of Article I, section 9 barred all federal officers, from the president on 
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Power to Interpret International Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1762, 1772 (2009) (implying that the President 
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argued that the clause did not even apply to the President because the clause says 
“Office,” and based on a survey of the use of the term “office” throughout the 
Constitution, the term “office” typically applies to unelected members of the 
executive branch, not the President.121 He claimed that many other scholars, 
originalists and others, agreed with the position that “office” means the same 
thing throughout the Constitution.122 More recently, the President’s lawyers, 
claiming allegiance to original meaning,123 have asserted that, even if the clause 
does apply to the President, it only covers emoluments from “offices.”124 
First, let us take the argument that the clause does not apply to the President. 
This is a classic form of textual gerrymandering—an argument that takes text out 
of context to create a new meaning.125 Let us assume that, in some parts of the 
Constitution, the term “office” means a lower ranking, unelected, member of the 
executive branch. The problem comes in moving that definition from one part of 
the Constitution (call this the home clause) to another part (the receiving clause). 
Once isolated from the home clause, the term “office” is recontextualized within 
the receiving clause. If the home clause only covers unelected officials, then the 
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throughout the Constitution. William Baude, Constitutional Officers: A Very Close Reading, JOTWELL 
(July 28, 2016), http://conlaw.jotwell.com/constitutional-officers-a-very-close-reading 
[https://perma.cc/B7Q8-XZLP]. To be fair, Tillman also relies upon various historical claims, but this 
simply illustrates the problems with using a pragmatically enhanced text as a baseline for historical 
research. Tillman, supra note 120, at 411–17. 
 123. “The scope of any constitutional provision is determined by the original public meaning of 
the Constitution’s text.” MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE 
PRESIDENT 4 (2017), https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3280261/MLB-White-Paper-1-10-
Pm.pdf [https://perma.cc/V77Y-2XXU] [hereinafter MORGAN LEWIS WHITE PAPER]. 
 124. Id. 
 125. For the equivalent of this in statutory interpretation, see Nourse, supra note 15. 
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receiving clause is now deemed to cover unelected officials. Such inferences, 
however, can rewrite the Constitution. The transferred home context effectively 
amends the new receiving context—the Foreign Emoluments Clause—by 
inserting the term “unelected.” Of course, that is not the actual text of the 
Constitution. The term “unelected” does not exist in the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause; it has been added by the interpreter. 
Under “analytic textualism,” one asks whether a pragmatic addition such 
as “unelected” is falsified by any other text in the Constitution. And, yes, there 
is powerful evidence that the President can be covered by the term “Office.” No 
one doubts that the President can be impeached. And so, no one should doubt 
that the term “Office” in the Foreign Emoluments Clause can easily be 
interpreted to cover an elected official like the President. Article II, Section 4 
provides that the President “shall be removed from Office by Impeachment” for 
“high crimes and [m]isdemeanors.”126 Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 provides that 
the “Judgement in cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal 
from Office.”127 This falsification procedure allows us to see that the claimed 
textual enrichment is not the “only possible” interpretation; in fact, it is not a 
terribly plausible enrichment at all: even President Trump’s lawyers now admit 
that the Foreign Emoluments Clause does in fact cover the President.128 
Second, let us turn to the President’s emoluments-from-office 
interpretation, applying the same method.129 The argument is that the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause does not apply to President Trump because the only 
emoluments covered are benefits coming from a foreign office.130 Notice the 
 
 126. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all Civil Officers of the United 
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for . . . high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”). 
 127. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 (“Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further 
than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit 
under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, 
Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.”). 
 128. MORGAN LEWIS WHITE PAPER, supra note 123, at 4. It is worth noting that by invoking this 
comparison, I am not repeating “borrowing” errors. My claim is not that the impeachment clauses use 
the term “Office,” therefore the term “Office” in the Foreign Emoluments Clause must include the 
President. I am using that clause to negate a hypothesized interpretation, not to demand a particular 
textual reading. 
 129. Professor Natelson argues that the “original meaning” of the emoluments clause requires 
“compensation with financial value, received by reason of public employment.” Natelson, supra note 
121 at 1. Professor Grewal appears to concur with Natelson’s view, although he is not focused on 
historical evidence. In both cases, their textual methodology depends upon comparing the Foreign 
Emoluments Clause with other instances of “emolument” in the Constitution. I believe that this 
methodology fails because its choice of text—the single word emolument—is faulty (reducing the 
information economy too narrowly) and assumes that which it is trying to prove (that emolument in the 
domestic sphere must mean the same thing in the foreign sphere). There is no reason to assume, ex ante, 
that the clauses in which the term “emolument” appears use the term in precisely the same way. As 
originalists themselves avow, text takes its meaning from context, and the contexts of the compared 
clauses are quite different. See infra discussion at notes 138–140 (comparing the overall purposes of the 
domestic and foreign emoluments clauses). 
 130. Nothing in this Article presumes to be a comprehensive review of the emoluments literature, 
which since the initial draft of this Article has grown exponentially. My point is that the President’s 
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pragmatic addition to the text: “only-emoluments-from-office.” Just as we have 
seen in earlier additions, there are new terms added—“from office”—and they 
are made exclusive and hard-edged—emoluments “only . . . from office.” As we 
have also seen, this interpretation gains its power from isolating the term 
“Emolument” from the rest of the clause. 
If we open up the interpretive window just a bit, the proposed pragmatic 
enrichments falter as plausible readings. First, the enriched “emolument from 
office” interpretation makes the clause implausibly redundant (“emolument from 
office, office”). Second, since the President cannot accept a foreign “Office” in 
any event, that prohibition presumptively includes foreign office benefits, 
effectively eliminating the term “emolument” in such cases. Third, and most 
importantly, the addition of exclusivity (“only emoluments from office”) renders 
other terms surplusage. “[P]resents . . . of any kind whatever”131 surely includes 
uncompensated foreign benefits132 given to the President that are not given to 
others.133 
Just as we saw in the earlier “the-President-is-not-covered” argument, the 
“emolument-from-office” argument depends upon strained inferences drawn 
from other constitutional texts.134 The term “Emolument” has been taken out of 
two home clauses and redefined as “only-emolument-from-office” in the 
receiving Foreign Emoluments Clause. The home clauses are: (1) the Domestic 
Incompatibility Clause, which bars members of Congress from assuming “any 
civil Office created, or . . . the Emoluments whereof shall have been 
 
arguments on emoluments, like other arguments we see in this Article, do not depend upon the text of 
the Constitution but upon meaning added to the Constitution, here “emoluments from office.” 
 131. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. This Article assumes, for sake of argument, that benefits to the 
President’s businesses are in fact benefits attributable to the President. The clause may suggest to the 
contrary since it applies to “persons.” 
 132. Samuel Johnson’s eighteenth century dictionary defines “present” as “a gift; a donative 
something ceremonially given; a letter or mandate exhibited.” Present, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (Samuel Johnson ed., 1755). In turn it defines “gift” as “[a] thing given or bestowed; the act 
of giving; oblation; offering; the right or power of bestowing; power; faculty.” Gift, id. That dictionary 
also defines Emolument as “[p]rofit; advantage.” Emolument, id.; see Grewal, supra note 121, at 4 n.10 
(noting that the “office-related definition” became the principal definition by the end of the nineteenth 
century, but that the more general definition of “benefit” is found in the 1755 classic). This suggests, of 
course, that the “office” meaning is not in fact the “original” meaning. For a more comprehensive 
analysis, see Mikhail, Definition, supra note 121. 
 133. For example, governments that provide tax, trademark, or other benefits to the President 
alone would presumably be giving “presents” to the President, requiring congressional approval. Lest 
someone claim that these would not be covered because they are intangible presents, the term 
“emolument” has traditionally been used to cover intangible as well as tangible benefits. See, e.g., 
Natelson, supra note 121 at 13–14 (defining emoluments to include a soldier’s right to forage or a 
seaman’s right to obtain booty from ship captures as long as these benefits could be “convertible to 
money”). 
 134. Natelson, who looks at historical definitions, does not confine his study to foreign 
emoluments but uses references to domestic emoluments to support his claim that the historical meaning 
of the term is best read as emolument-from-office. See id. at 13–16. 
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[i]ncreased”;135 and (2) the Compensation Clause, which guarantees the 
President’s compensation during his term of office and prohibits him from 
“receiv[ing] within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or 
any of them.”136 From these clauses, the President’s lawyers infer that foreign 
emoluments must come from an “office.” Since the home clauses address offices, 
it is assumed that the receiving clauses address offices,137 even when the clauses 
address entirely different subject-matter. 
To put it bluntly: the home clauses have nothing to do with foreign affairs. 
The Incompatibility Clause focuses on the entirely domestic relationship of the 
President and Congress.138 House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi or Senate 
Majority Leader Mitch McConnell may not simultaneously sit in the Congress 
and as Cabinet members. Nor may they create new offices in the executive 
branch, raise the pay of those offices, and then benefit from that pay raise. 
Equally focused on domestic affairs, the Presidential Compensation Clause bars 
legislative bribery. As Benjamin Franklin once explained, one of the defects of 
the Pennsylvania state constitution was that every time the Governor approved a 
bill, he would exact a payment from the legislature.139 Legislation was 
“purchased” with the increase of the Governor’s salary. The Framers viewed140 
these clauses as central to the separation of powers;141 they do nothing to address 
foreign influence over the President. 
 
 135. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which 
he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall 
have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been [i]ncreased during such time; and no 
Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his 
Continuance in Office.”). 
 136. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (“The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, 
a Compensation, which shall neither be [i]ncreased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall 
have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United 
States, or any of them.”). The idea here is that the President will be receiving other compensation from 
his service in the “office” of the presidency. 
 137. It seems to me to make perfect sense to read the presidential Compensation Clause, U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7, as applying to benefits from office because it says “he shall not receive within 
that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.” In short, the clause 
“Emolument from the United States,” implies that the emolument comes from an “office,” at a 
minimum, although it also includes other government payments. By contrast, the Foreign Emoluments 
Clause provides that no person may accept “any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind 
whatever” from a foreign government. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8. In the first case, the term 
“Emolument” is explicitly modified by a term suggesting “office”—from the United States—in the latter 
case it appears in a list separated from the term “Office.” 
 138. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2. 
 139. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 99 (Max Farrand ed., 1937) 
(statement of Benjamin Franklin of Pennsylvania, June 4, 1787). 
 140. See Victoria Nourse, Toward A “Due Foundation” for the Separation of Powers: The 
Federalist Papers as Political Narrative, 74 TEX. L. REV. 447, 459–61 (1996) (discussing pervasive 
concern during the founding era about the corruption of government leaders and the debate at the 
Constitutional Convention about the President’s independence). 
 141. Id. at 450–52 (describing the “‘due foundation’ for the separation of powers [as] a 
foundation built upon the independence of persons”); see also Steven G. Calabresi & Joan L. Larsen, 
One Person, One Office: Separation of Powers or Separation of Personnel?, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 
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Lest this all seem too abstract, consider the strange results these borrowing 
maneuvers create. Under the President’s interpretation, the only cases that the 
term “Emolument” would cover would be something like this situation: the 
British government gives the President the fringe benefits of an office like the 
Earldom of Ipswich (e.g. the use of the castle and golf course).142 Of course, it is 
important that the President not be given the title “Earl of Ipswich” because that 
is already barred by the clause. Even then, however, it is not clear why these 
benefits would not be barred as a “present:” a gift “of any kind” bestowed on the 
President by a foreign government. The only way one eliminates “present” from 
the Foreign Emoluments Clause is by isolating and focusing so hard on the term 
“Emolument” that one forgets the rest of the clause. 
The proper interpretive approach refuses to add meaning to the text. The 
term “emolument” is ambiguous: at the Founding, emolument meant both 
“benefit” in a general sense and “benefit from an office.”143 Once we stop 
focusing on that particular term and turn to the clause as a whole, three things 
seem clear. First, as we have seen, the clause is redundant. If the President is 
named the Earl of Ipswich and accepts the benefits of that office, that action is 
covered four times—as a present, office, emolument, and title. Second, the 
clause errs on the side of over-, rather than under-, inclusion. It applies to “any 
present, Emolument . . . Title, of any kind whatever.”144 Third, Congress is 
assigned the ultimate power to determine its effect. Even if a court were to err in 
finding that something constituted an “Emolument,” the clause would give 
Congress power to allow the President to accept it.145 Altogether, these textual 
features counsel against a narrow interpretation. At the very least, courts should 
reject any purported “originalist” argument that gerrymanders meaning, both 
adding and subtracting from the Constitution’s text. 
 
1050–52, 1062–65 (1994) (arguing that “separation of personnel” is necessary for separation of powers 
and that these clauses resulted in “reinforc[ing] . . . the separation of powers”). 
 142. See, e.g., Natelson, supra note 121, at 13 (describing “Definition No. 1” as “fringe 
benefits”); id. at 13 (“Perhaps the most frequent meaning [of ‘fringe benefits’] in political discourse was 
also the narrowest.”). But see Emolument, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Samuel 
Johnson ed., 1755) (defining “emolument” as “[p]rofit; advantage”). 
 143. See e.g., Address to the People of Great Britain (Oct. 21, 1774), in 1 JOURNALS OF THE 
CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774, at 84 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1904–1937) (“You [the British 
people] restrained our [American] trade in every way that could conduce to your emolument.”); see 
Natelson, supra note 121, at 12–20 (describing four meanings including “all benefits” and writing that 
“All four [definitions] were very common”). 
 144. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
 145. This was a significant change from the Clause as it appears in the Articles of Confederation 
where it did not allow for congressional approval. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. VI, para. 
1. George Mason famously declared that he could not sign a constitution in which Congress could in 
fact allow a President to serve in a foreign office. George Mason, Speech at the Convention of Virginia 
(June 15, 1788), in 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 483 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1827), https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/ampage?collId=lled&fileName=003/lled003.db&recNum=495&itemLink=D%3Fhlaw%3A1%3A
.%2Ftemp%2F~ammem_UEDc%3A%3A%230030496&linkText=1 [https://perma.cc/T38N-8LMC]. 
32 CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  106:1 
B. Removal and Pragmatic Enrichment 
Can the President remove his subordinates based on whim, political 
preference, or hair color? Unitary executivists say “yes,” on the theory that 
Congress may not limit the President by requiring that he show “good cause” to 
terminate executive branch officers. The removal power often seems technical 
to many students of the Constitution, but originalist work urges that the 
President’s power to remove officers implies something very important about 
the administrative state. Supporters of the unitary executive believe that making 
the President the hierarchical head of the executive will mean that so-called 
“independent” agencies are unconstitutional.146 There are real-world 
consequences to this problem. If the unitary executivists are right, the President 
can fire the head of the Office of Government Ethics or the head of the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau, despite the fact that Congress permits dismissal 
only after a term of years or for good reasons.147 
As noted earlier, the classic originalist treatment decries opponents of the 
unitary executive for failing to pay sufficient attention to the text of the 
Constitution. Originalists argue that their opponents are wrong in asserting a 
fourth “administrative” power, when the Constitution only provides for three 
departments.148 Put in other words, they argue that their opponents are enriching 
the Constitution’s text with added meaning. And, indeed, if the argument really 
was that there was some “fourth” power, that would be an inappropriate 
enrichment. (As we have seen in the case of Justice Black’s opinion in Steel 
Seizure, liberal textualists are not immune from criticism that they too add to the 
text). One rather obvious problem with this argument, however, is the 
assumption that “administrative” means something other than “executive.” To 
execute is to administer.149 Let us imagine that the Vesting Clause read, “the 
 
 146. CALABRESI & YOO, supra note 14, at 4 (arguing that, under the unitary executive theory, 
“congressional efforts to insulate executive branch subordinates from presidential control by creating 
independent agencies and counsels are in essence unconstitutional”). 
 147. 5 U.S.C. App. 4 § 401 (2012) (the head of the Office of Government Ethics to serve a five-
year term). The Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau serves for a term of five years 
and may only be removed for cause. 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c) (2012) (The President may remove the Director 
for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office). Other statutes that include a “good faith” 
cause requirement include the head of the Federal Trade Commission. See 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012). 
 148. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 2, at 547 (responding to Lessig & Sunstein); cf. Lessig & 
Sunstein, supra note 32, at 118 (arguing that the Framers “did not believe that the President must have 
plenary power over all we now think of as administration”). 
 149. Administer, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/administer [https://perma.cc/XH4J-K6NS] (defining administer as “to manage 
or supervise the execution, use, or conduct of”); Administer, MERRIAM-WEBSTER THESAURUS, 
https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/administer [https://perma.cc/AM3T-L4JN] (listing 
“execute” as a synonym for “administer”); Execute, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, 
https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/execute [https://perma.cc/6YR4-AZWS] (listing 
“administer” as a synonym for “execute”); Administer, DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://www.dictionary.com/browse/administer [https://perma.cc/6Y5E-NQJL] (listing “execute” as a 
synonym for “administer”); Execute, DICTIONARY.COM, http://www.dictionary.com/browse/execute 
[https://perma.cc/U8Y4-5SW2] (listing “administer” as a synonym for “execute”). 
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President shall have executive-but-not-administrative power.” This sentence is 
self-contradicting.150 
Even if there were a difference between execution and administration, the 
unitary executive claim would remain one of pragmatic enrichment. Defenders 
of the unitary executive explain that the Constitution provides three departments 
and therefore there are only three kinds of power.151 Of course the number three 
can in theory be “at least” three or “at most” three or “perhaps more than” 
three.152 It is no surprise that this kind of enrichment—adding an “exclusivity” 
term—has surfaced once again. We have seen this with Justice Black’s 
pragmatic inference in Steel Seizure (“all” legislative power). We have seen this 
with Justice Scalia’s dissent in Morrison v. Olson (“all” executive power).153 We 
have seen this in the President’s interpretation of the Foreign Emoluments Clause 
(“only” from office). In each case, the hard-edged nature of the rule has been 
created by the interpreter, not by the text itself. 
Since the Constitution’s text does not address removal,154 the textual 
argument for removal is a hypothesized interpretation (“all executive power” 
includes removal). Since this is a hypothesis, it must be tested against the rest of 
the Constitution. Measured in such a fashion, the hypothetical interpretation 
fails. The Necessary and Proper Clause provides Congress with at least some 
power to structure the administration in ways that do not preclude “proper” 
limitations. If Congress has some power to limit the President’s removal power, 
then the hypothetical interpretation—“all power”—should fail as an 
interpretation that considers the entire text. 
In an important set of articles, John Mikhail has argued, for example, that 
the “necessary and proper clauses” “cancel” the exclusivity inference that many 
have drawn from a listing of legislative enumerated powers under Article I, 
Section 8. As Mikhail explains, there are three “necessary and proper clauses,” 
the first referring to Congress’s own powers enumerated in Section 8,155 the 
second providing Congress with the power to implement “all other [p]owers” 
granted to the federal government under the Constitution,156 and the third 
 
 150. Interestingly Professor Prakash in an earlier student comment called the unitary executive 
theory the “Chief Administrator Theory.” See Saikrishna Bangalore Prakash, Hail to the Chief 
Administrator: The Framers and the President’s Administrative Powers, 102 YALE L.J. 991, 991–92 
(1992). 
 151. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States . . . .”); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in 
a President of the United States of America.”); U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the 
United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court . . . .”). 
 152. See Soames, supra note 57, at 451–53. 
 153. See supra Part III. 
 154. Unitary executivists sometimes concede this point. See, e.g., Prakash, supra note 2, at 224 
(describing the removal power as an “unspecified” power deriving from the Vesting Clause). 
 155.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers . . . .”). 
 156.  Id. (“[A]nd all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United 
States . . . .”). 
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granting Congress the power to implement “all other powers” vested by the 
Constitution in any “Department or officer” of the United States.157 The 
President’s power to execute the law falls within “other powers” granted to the 
federal government and/or an “officer” of the United States under the 
Constitution. That, in turn, gives Congress the power to assist the President in 
his enumerated power to faithfully execute the law. At the very least, it cancels 
the pragmatic enrichment that Congress has no power whatsoever to shape the 
executive branch.158 
If this is correct, whatever hypothetical inference unitary executivists draw 
from Article II’s Vesting Clause may be canceled or at least negated by the 
“third” “necessary and proper clause.” The pragmatic inference, remember, is 
that the President has “all” executive power where “all” means “all executive 
power to nullify, remove, or otherwise control” executive officers (including 
those Congress seeks to protect from purely political dismissal).159 Under the 
third necessary and proper clause, Congress has the power to create entities that 
assist the executive. The executive is a “Department or officer” vested with 
power under the Constitution to execute the law and thus Congress has the power 
to assist in implementation by providing institutions and offices to aid the 
executive. Since the Founding, Congress has acted to create such institutions, as 
for example, when Congress created the Department of the Treasury and the 
Department of State.160 Originalists insist that this aid must be limited to an 
enumerated executive power,161 but in fact there is an enumerated executive 
power—the power to faithfully execute the laws.162 After all, if Congress did not 
create such entities, would we really expect the President himself to be collecting 
customs duties or litigating cases? The President needs institutions, and officers, 
to help him or her execute the law. 
The only real textual limit on Congress’s power to assist the President in 
execution is that the law must be “proper.”163 It seems fairly easy, however, to 
argue that it is proper to restrain Presidents from removing the heads of 
departments for purely arbitrary or partisan reasons. If Congress, for example, 
wants to maintain market or legal stability across administrations and to ensure 
this by preventing dismissal of officers for political or arbitrary reasons, that 
presumably is a “proper” reason because it aids in the execution of the law (as 
 
 157. Id. (“[O]r in any Department or Officer thereof.”); John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper 
Clauses, 102 GEO. L. J. 1045, 1046–47 (2014). 
 158. See Mikhail, supra note 157, at 1056 (arguing that the “all other Powers” language was 
“presumably intended to give Congress whatever instrumental power it needed to organize and regulate 
the other branches and agencies of the government”). 
 159. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 2, at 599 (arguing that “the President must be able to control 
subordinate executive officers through the mechanisms of removal, nullification, and execution of the 
discretion ‘assigned’ to them himself”). 
 160. See Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 32, at 25. 
 161. Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 2, at 589. 
 162. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 163. See Prakash, supra note 150, at 1009–11. 
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opposed to arbitrary decision-making).164 This does not mean that there might 
not be other limits on Congress’s structuring of agencies. As I have argued 
elsewhere, Congress cannot, for example, require that the Senate “approve” of 
the President’s decision to remove an officer. If that were true, the Senate would 
have enormous power over the executive branch, forcing the President to retain 
officers at the whim of a filibustering Senate minority. That much is very clear 
from history; Madison warned that such a practice would cause the executive 
branch to slide into the Congress.165 Limiting the President’s removal to “good 
faith” reasons for dismissing the head of a Commission or Board, however, is a 
far cry from an attempt by Congress to insinuate its members into positions 
within the executive branch or holding up the President’s removal by requiring 
Senate approval.166 
To sum up, the unitary executive argument hinges on a reading of Article 
II that depends upon an inference that adds text to the Constitution—that there 
are only three departments. Analytic textualism asks whether this hypothesis is 
negated by other texts in the Constitution. The answer is that the necessary and 
proper clauses provide Congress the power to shape the executive branch in ways 
that assist the President in enforcing the law.167 At the very least, these clauses 
negate the claim that the text of the Constitution demands the unitary executive 
theory, and expose it as a creation of the interpreter, not the text. 
C. Non-Enforcement Power 
During the Obama administration, originalists claimed that the 
administration was acting unconstitutionally by failing to enforce immigration 
law, specifically, that executive actions regarding Dreamers and their parents168 
 
 164. Unitary executivists concede that the Necessary and Proper Clause “enables Congress to 
assist the President in the fulfillment of his constitutional duties,” Prakash, supra note 150, at 1011, but 
argue that it does not permit the creation of an “independent agency,” because that would be improper, 
id. Part of the problem here is that the argument fails to explain what is precisely meant by an 
“independent agency,” which is to say an agency whose head can only be removed by the President for 
misconduct in office, barring what are purely political or arbitrary dismissals, or one whose head has a 
fixed term. Critics claim that the Congress cannot restrict the President’s discretion. That claim simply 
assumes what it is trying to prove—that the President has unlimited constitutional power of removal. 
See also Prakash, supra note 2, at 233 (citing for a similar proposition, Gary Lawson & Patricia B. 
Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping 
Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 333–34 (1993)). In any event, my argument here is only that the assumption 
of “all” executive power to remove is an invention of a nonexistent textual power. 
 165. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 113–16 (1926). President Andrew Johnson was 
impeached because he failed to abide by the Tenure of Office Act which required that Congress approve 
of the President’s decision to remove a Cabinet official. 
 166. See, e.g., Nourse, supra note 140, at 517–18 (arguing that Madison did not believe the 
Senate should have a role in removal but approved Congress’s limitation on the tenure of offices, such 
as the office of the Comptroller General). 
  167. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 168. The Obama administration issued an internal Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
memorandum allowing the Director of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to not 
enforce the removal provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) against individuals known 
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were unconstitutional. At the time, originalists Robert Delahunty and John Yoo 
argued that the text of the Constitution required the President to act and non-
enforcement of the immigration laws was therefore unconstitutional.169 In short, 
if Delahunty and Yoo are correct, the originalist position would suggest that 
President Trump may not decline to enforce domestic law. This is likely to cause 
liberals to find originalism on non-enforcement suddenly more appealing than it 
was during the Obama years. Nevertheless, this position, like the ones we have 
seen before on emoluments and removal depends upon pragmatic enrichment of 
the text. 
Delahunty and Yoo’s textual argument begins with the “Take Care Clause.” 
Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution states that the President 
“shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” They emphasize that the 
clause takes the “imperative” form, using the term “shall.” Invoking Dr. Samuel 
Johnson’s Dictionary of the English Language, Delahunty and Yoo argue 
“Johnson defines the meanings of the adverb ‘faithfully’ to include both ‘[w]ith 
strict adherence to duty and allegiance’ and ‘[w]ithout failure of performance; 
honestly; exactly.’” They conclude: The Take Care Clause is thus naturally read 
as an instruction or command to the President to put the laws into effect, or at 
least to see that they are put into effect, “without failure” and “exactly.”170 
The pragmatic enrichment here is obvious: the authors have added the term 
“exactly” (a hard-edged additive) to the Take Care Clause. Under “analytic 
textualism,” one looks to see whether any other clause falsifies that inference. 
One immediate textual answer against such an enrichment comes from the term 
“faithfully.” “Faithfully” assumes, in my view, that exactitude is not in fact 
required; honest good faith efforts may fail. Even fiduciaries may make mistakes, 
as long as they honestly seek to further their client’s interest.171 Samuel 
 
as “Dreamers.” That term refers to undocumented students who would have benefited from the 
Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act. USCIS was authorized to do so 
through “deferred action,” an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Robert J. Delahunty & John C. Yoo, 
Dream On: The Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act, and 
the Take Care Clause, 91 TEX. L. REV. 781, 786–89 (2013). The Obama administration subsequently 
expanded the deferred action criteria to apply to the parents of citizens and legal permanent residents of 
the United States. Ming H. Chen, Beyond Legality: The Legitimacy of Executive Action in Immigration 
Law, 66 SYRACUSE L. REV. 87, 92 (2016). 
 169. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 168, at 784. 
 170. Interestingly enough, Delahunty and Yoo actually deploy a kind of canceling logic when 
considering this claim and the meaning of the Vesting Clause. They believe the Vesting Clause confers 
“the entirety” of executive power on the President. One might then ask why one would need the Take 
Care Clause. They posit that the Vesting Clause includes a power to suspend or refuse to enforce law 
that the Take Care Clause “dispels.” Id. at 799–800. 
 171. See Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) (discussing the fiduciary obligations of 
corporate directors and officers and noting that “a corporate officer who makes a mistake in 
judgment . . . will rarely, if ever, be found liable”); Patricia L. Bellia, Faithful Execution and 
Enforcement Discretion, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1753, 1770 (2016); Joseph K. Leahy, A Decade After 
Disney: A Primer on Good and Bad Faith, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 859, 889–90 (2015) (noting that courts 
will not assume bad faith when a corporation’s board of directors makes a mistake but will instead 
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Johnson’s ancient dictionary, invoked for its pragmatic enrichment, is not 
definitive on this matter.172 Supporting this argument—against enriching the text 
with the term “exactly”—is the Presidential Oath Clause, which seems to cancel 
any notion that President has a duty of precise enforcement, since it requires only 
that the President faithfully execute the laws “to the best of” his ability.173 
The term “faithfully,” however, has not satisfied a variety of scholars who 
argue that the text is complex. Those who support the notion of “exact” 
enforcement argue that the veto power suggests that the President has only one 
shot at negating a law through Article I, Section 7,174 rather than two shots—one 
at signing and then another at the time of enforcement. That argument, however, 
does not account for discretionary non-enforcement falling short of an effective 
veto. Here again, the textual arguments of those who insist on “exact” 
enforcement run into the problem that the terms “executive” power and 
“faithfully” execute suggest that there is room for Presidential judgment.175 
These terms tend to cancel or at least undermine the claim that interpreters should 
effectively add the term “exactly” to the Take Care Clause. 
Without creative additions, the text is unlikely to solve the Presidential non-
enforcement problem. On the one hand, few believe the President can ignore the 
law. As the Supreme Court held in Kendall v. United States in 1838: “To contend 
that the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully executed, 
implies a power to forbid their execution; is a novel construction of the 
constitution, and is entirely inadmissible.”176 The Founders had no interest in 
granting a President the monarchical equivalent of an ability to “dispense” with 
Congress’s laws. As the Kendall court explained: 
It would be vesting in the President a dispensing power, which has no 
countenance for its support in any part of the constitution; and is 
asserting a principle, which, if carried out in its results to all cases falling 
within it, would be clothing the President with a power to control the 
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 176. 37 U.S. 524, 525 (1838). 
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legislation of congress, and paralyze the administration of justice.177 
These statements, however, do not settle the textual question. To arrive at 
“exact” enforcement, the interpreter must add meaning to the text of the Take 
Care Clause, yielding an inference that is negated by other text. In the absence 
of a clear text, the most we can say of the non-enforcement power is that the 
devil is likely to end up in the details: one must ask precisely what the President 
is “not” enforcing. If the President refuses to enforce a “mandatory” duty, there 
are good arguments that the President, in domestic affairs, must comply with 
Congress’s mandatory statute.178 When the statute provides the President with 
discretion, however, then the answer may well be different. The President surely 
has power to direct his Cabinet to exercise discretion when in fact Congress has 
provided discretion. In any future case, it will be up to courts to determine 
whether the action amounts to “faithful” execution or “blithe” ignorance. 
V. 
ANALYTIC TEXTUALISM DEFENDED AND THEORIZED 
So far, I have highlighted how originalist interpreters, whether judges or 
scholars, add meaning to the text by pragmatic enrichments that suggest “hard-
edged,” rule-like qualities that do not exist in the text of the Constitution or may 
be falsified by other parts of the Constitution. More generally, I have argued that 
interpreters are forced to add and subtract meaning because they artificially limit 
the information economy by focusing narrowly on single words ripped from their 
context. If one starts by limiting oneself to a word or two, one will be unable to 
find meaning without adding or enriching meaning. 
In this Part, I defend this approach against objections. First, I defend the 
assumption that constitutional interpretation must be consistent with basic rules 
governing communication. Second, I explain why “analytic textualism” and 
falsifying technique is an improvement over intratextualism, and is consistent 
with theories of structural inference or constitutional holism. Third, I explain 
why originalists who hope for historical precisification must recognize that their 
starting place—the choice of text—may raise significant risks of confirmation 
bias and error. If one starts from a false textual inference, then historical evidence 
confirming that interpretation does not honor the text; it violates it. Indeed, this 
may be one reason why the vast majority of judges have never been 
constitutional monists (following text alone) but have embraced pluralistic 
modes of reasoning (such as text, structure, history, and consequences) as a 
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2018] RECLAIMING THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT 39 
defense against false textual inferences imposed by an artificial reduction of the 
interpretive information economy. 
A. The Constitution as Communication 
Critics will claim that the Constitution cannot be analyzed as if it were a 
casual conversation; it is a far more formal document.179 Formal communications 
are still communications—whether issued by a general or by a president. Indeed, 
formality suggests we should pay more, rather than less, attention to the text 
since it reflects deliberation.180 It would be a sad thing, as Justice Scalia used to 
say, if the people could not read their government’s own constitution,181 and 
reading, of course, requires communication. 
Others will suggest that conversations are liable to wide-ranging 
contradictions and digressions not likely to be found in formal documents. 
“Analytic textualism” does not assume either logical contradiction or inadvertent 
inconsistencies; it assumes the possibility of clarifying hypothesized readings by 
asking whether they can be falsified by means of other text. It assumes that a 
formal document is likely to express compromises that may not be reflected in 
small pieces of text, but require a wider view. It opens the information economy 
to test a hypothesized meaning. To make an analogy to a conversation: the theory 
assumes that one cannot take a single statement from the conversation but must 
look at how the conversation itself clarifies meaning. 
Just as conversations proceed by iterative process, drafting of formal 
documents proceeds by give-and-take over time. Our Constitution began with 
competing drafts. Seriatim discussion of particular parts of the proposed drafts 
led to changes. Those changes in turn raised further amendments. Refinements 
were issued by committees and referred back to the whole. This is really not so 
different from a conversation. Party A proposes a plan to go to lunch. Party B 
asks: “Where do you want to go to lunch?” Party A says he wants to go to lunch 
at the Restaurant Bis near the Capitol. Party B amends that by saying he would 
prefer to go to Alexandria, and so on. Conversation, like drafting, can involve a 
good deal of iterative give-and-take to settle on a final plan. 
Some have urged that, in constitutional and other contexts, we should adopt 
interpretive norms from contract law.182 As Randy Barnett has argued, the 
Constitution is not a contract.183 Contracts have the consent of all the parties; 
there never has been unanimous consent to our Constitution. But even if the 
 
 179. A more sophisticated form of this argument is that Gricean maxims of cooperation should 
not prevail in cases of complex formal documents. See Williams, supra note 62, at 542. As noted earlier, 
I make no claim that those who debated the Constitution always agreed; they agreed enough to produce 
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 180. Barnett, supra note 18, at 631. 
 181. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 46–47 (1997). 
 182. Baude & Sachs, supra note 40. 
 183. Barnett, supra note 39, at 616. 
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Constitution were a contract, sophisticated interpreters of contracts know that the 
words of a document are not enough to give it meaning—inference is necessary. 
As contract theorists have argued, “communication” is only possible because of 
a “sophisticated process of pragmatic inference.”184 Like all communications, 
contract terms can be ambiguous, vague, or otherwise require enrichment by 
reference to context or other information. In this sense, my approach is no 
different than how an interpreter might interpret a contract. 
B. Intratextualism, Structural Inference, and Constitutional Holism 
All of this brings me to defend the falsification method I have suggested 
when addressing proposed pragmatic inferences. Some might question whether 
this approach amounts to “intratextualism,” a term coined by the 
constititutionalist Akhil Amar.185 There is a surface similarity in the sense that 
both theories seek to understand the text by focusing on the text, rather than on 
recourse outside of the text. There is a deeper difference, however: 
Intratextualism imagines that similar words or strings of words should be read 
similarly or that variation in language is meaningful. This requires judgments 
about the similarity or dissimilarity of terms.186 “Analytic textualism” makes no 
such assumption, indeed it seeks to interrogate such assumptions, by attempting 
to falsify claimed similarity relationships. In this sense, intratextualism and 
analytic textualism are opposites: Intratextualism assumes a coherent 
document;187 verified, non-reductive textualism does not.188 
Intratextualist arguments are fully capable of adding pragmatic meaning 
without acknowledging this important fact. As we saw in the discussion of the 
Foreign Emoluments Clause, intratextual arguments may be full of pragmatic 
enrichments that come from excising particular words from one “home” clause 
and moving that enrichment to a different “receiving” clause, where the term 
takes on a new meaning. That new meaning may or may not be true, depending 
upon underlying judgments of similarity or dissimilarity. So, for example, the 
assumption that “office” must mean the same thing throughout the Constitution 
leads to the verging-on-silly argument that the Foreign Emoluments Clause does 
 
 184. “[B]y harnessing, and then processing, more information than merely the text, more 
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not apply to the President. Intratextualism depends upon contestable assumptions 
of coherence and similarity that need to be defended, not assumed.189 
“Analytic textualism” is consistent with, and in fact reinforces, arguments 
based on structural relationships created by the constitutional text. Charles Black 
famously argued that we should interpret the Constitution to enforce its structure 
and relationships.190 Black’s emphasis on constitutional relationships remains 
exceedingly important and often misunderstood. “Analytic textualism” 
recognizes the importance of those relationships. When one pulls a word or a 
couple of words out of the clauses of the Constitution, there is a risk that one will 
sever any embedded relationships that might exist elsewhere in the document 
across clauses or articles. For example, severing the Vesting Clauses from the 
rest of the provisions in Articles I and II gives us a false picture of the President’s 
powers as exclusive when we know that, in many important instances, such as 
the making of legislation, the President and the Congress share power. 
Similarly, “analytic textualism” supports a holistic approach toward the 
constitutional text defined as one that recognizes intertemporal relationships.191 
Vicki Jackson, among others, has argued that we should read amendments to the 
Constitution as amending the whole Constitution, including prior amendments 
and provisions in the original framework constitution.192 So, for example, the 
Fourteenth Amendment, or at least its values, should be read as modifying the 
meaning of the Commerce Clause in cases where commerce and discrimination 
intersect.193 Holism, as suggested by Jackson, refuses to pull one amendment out 
without looking at later amendments. Nothing in “analytic textualism” rejects 
that approach; in fact, to the extent that it is non-reductive, it is fully consistent 
with the idea that pragmatic enrichments must be tested against later textual 
modifications to the Constitution. 
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VI. 
RECONCEIVING PLURALISM AS CONSTRAINT? 
For all of the particularity on which I have defended “analytic textualism,” 
no one should think that, in matters of constitutional structure, I believe that this 
is the end of any sound constitutional analysis. If anything, I have shown that the 
text on key matters involving executive power is vague. I sincerely doubt that, if 
in the near future courts are faced with questions of executive power, they will 
resort only to text, rather than the standard multi-modal argument in which they 
look at text, history, structure, and consequences to interpret a text. 
My own theory of the separation of powers requires that courts consider 
deeply the consequences of their actions to the people194 (for all shifts in 
governance privilege some constituencies over others) and to the future of 
governmental structure. The Founders were not linguists; they were practical 
men creating a political structure, a government, and they reasoned about 
constitutional structure in terms of how the government would work in practice, 
not based on “parchment barriers.”195 They knew that “parchment barriers” had 
failed in securing a separation of powers under state constitutions; that is why 
there is no express separation of powers clause in the Constitution, or the Bill of 
Rights.196 
Textualism, alone, in my opinion, will never answer the hard questions 
about executive power. There is simply too little text for all of the complex 
situations courts are likely to face. This, of course, leaves us with the question 
about where the interpreter goes once text leaves no answers. Originalists will 
argue that one should look for the meaning of particular terms in history. If I am 
correct about interpretive enrichment, however, if one begins with a 
hypothesized textual interpretation that is not in fact true, and one looks for that 
interpretation in the historical record, one may simply be confirming a meaning 
that the text itself denies. For example, in the Foreign Emoluments Clause case, 
there is no doubt that the historical record is likely to refer to cases where 
emoluments were attached to offices, since terms like “salary and emoluments” 
or “fees and emoluments” were common usage.197 Looking for such usage, 
however, may only confirm a meaning—that the Foreign Emoluments Clause 
only covers emoluments related to a foreign or domestic office—that is not in 
the text of the Constitution. 
Traditionally, at least according to Blackstone,198 one applies a plurality of 
modalities. Critics of pluralism worry that this grab-bag of considerations is 
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insufficiently rule-like, that it includes no key to the code. If I am right about 
pragmatic enrichment, however, there may be a different way of defending 
pluralism’s longstanding history—as a constraint on false textual enrichments. 
One of the great problems in judicial decision-making is “motivated reasoning,” 
which is to say that a judge comes to a decision about who wins, based on her 
political views; she then seeks to confirm that view in the existing materials. 
Cognitive science calls this a recipe for “confirmation bias.” Judges are using 
materials to confirm their political priors, not to falsify their views. If this is right, 
critics are correct to wonder whether pluralistic approaches are constraining. Of 
course, the same reasoning applies to textualism: judges with political priors find 
their preferred meaning in the text, add pragmatic enrichments to the text, and 
look to historical materials on meaning to confirm their original bias. As we have 
seen, judges who like rule-like terms are fully capable of adding rule-like edges 
to a constitution that does not in fact include them. 
Why, then, would pluralism ever be more constraining than monistic 
attachment to text? Two reasons: first, pluralism opens up the information 
economy. As we have seen earlier, one of the reasons that judges interpolate is 
that the constitutional text is sparse. If there are competing interpretations, 
pluralism allows the interpreter to “falsify” their preferred meaning against the 
meanings offered by history, structure, and consequences. So, for example, if 
one really wanted to know whether the Framers believed in a textual 
interpretation of “all executive power,” one could test this against whether, in 
fact, Framers regularly used this phrase (which they did not).199 Recourse to the 
history of practical problems200 (like removal) for its potential effects upon 
constitutional structure, in turn, offers a check against meanings that will yield 
structural harm. Blackstone insisted on this element of the interpretive calculus 
in part because it rests upon the perfectly rational assumption that writers 
generally do not pen suicide notes. Assuming one believed that “all executive 
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power” in the domestic sphere was the proper pragmatic reading, one need only 
read Steel Seizure,201 or look at recent controversies about the use of torture,202 
or even President Barack Obama’s refusal to enforce the immigration law,203 to 
see how all Presidents will seek, when they believe it to be necessary, to expand 
their powers. 
CONCLUSION 
In important cases involving issues of executive power, originalists are not 
finding meaning in the Constitution, but adding to that meaning. If this is correct, 
theorists of originalism must have a more robust theory of the “interpretation 
zone,” one that defends the choice of text and pragmatic enrichments that could 
well be standing in for the interpreter’s preferences. As for non-originalists, it is 
time to insist upon the text of the Constitution, and to refuse to allow textual 
arguments that do not in fact reflect the actual Constitutional text. 
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